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NORWEGIAN ABSTRACT
Forskere som studerer religion i lys av evolusjon kan generelt deles i to skoler: En 
som ser religion som en evolusjonær adaptasjon (tilpasning), og en som ser det som 
et  biprodukt  av  andre  trekk.  Denne  oppgaven  argumenterer  for  at  konseptet 
adaptasjon  er  mer  komplekst  enn  slik  det  har  blitt  presentert  i 
religionsvitenskapen,  og  viser  til  temaer  i  den  tilsvarende  biologiske  diskursen. 
Videre sammenlignes dette med debatten om religions adaptive status, og som følge 
av dette åpnes det for flere nye forskningsspørsmål. Spesielt anbefales det å studere 
evolusjonen av kultur i seg selv, og å legge mindre vekt på skillet mellom religion 
som adaptasjon og biprodukt. Avslutningsvis følger også en generell argumentasjon 
for en evolusjonær religionsvitenskap.
Stikkord: religion, adaptasjon, biprodukt, evolusjon
This  work  is  licensed  under  the  Creative  Commons  Attribution-NonCommercial  3.0  Unported  
License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
We are  walking  archives  of  ancestral  wisdom.  Our 
bodies  and  minds  are  live  monuments  to  our 
forebears’ rare successes. This Darwin has thought us. 
The human eye, the brain, our instincts, are legacies 
of  natural  selection’s  victories,  embodiments  of  the 
cumulative experience of the past. And this biological 
inheritance has enabled us to build a new inheritance: 
a  cultural  ascent,  the  collective  endowment  of 
generations.  Science  is  part  of  this  legacy,  and  this 
book  is  about  one  of  its  foremost  achievements: 
Darwinian theory itself.
—Helena Cronin, The Ant and the Peacock
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I 
INTRODUCTION
volutionary approaches to the science of religion have in the past few decades 
started  to  re-emerge  as  a  powerful  paradigm  and  interdisciplinary  field  of 
research,  although the taint  of  association to E.  B.  Tylor  and J.  G.  Frazer’s 
hierarchical  cultural  evolutionism  still  looms  large.  Far  from  suggesting  a  uniform 
movement from magic through religion to science, as Frazer had envisioned (Frazer 1900), 
evolutionary scientists  of  religion today generally appreciate the fact that evolution is  a 
non-directional  process.  With  the  exception  of  the  so-called  ‘new  atheist’  movement, 
operating on the fringes of the scientific study of religion  (Geertz 2009), religion is no 
longer taken to be an intermediary stage on the way to scientific enlightenment, although 
the school of theorists claiming it to be a by-product of evolution might seem somewhat 
demeaning. And here lies some of the most interesting debate in the field: the question of  
whether or not religion is  an evolutionary adaptation is  arguably  the question dividing 
scientists of this emerging paradigm. Very briefly, the question is whether religion has been 
produced  by  natural  selection  because  it  confers  some  or  other  kind  of  reproductive 
advantage (typically to genes), or if it is simply an accidental by-product of other traits. The 
present thesis purports to show that the discussion of adaptation concerning religion has 
not been sufficiently informed by the respective discussion in biology. In light of this, I will 
E
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attempt to re-analyse the arguments for and against religion as an adaptation, and see if some  
helpful insights can be gained through this.
To begin with, I will briefly present the current evolutionary science of religion, and then 
discuss the term adaptation itself. Chapter II presents issues related to adaptation as they appear 
in evolutionary biology, and Chapter III reviews the state of debate in the study of religion.  
Chapter IV will aspire to connect the dots between the two fields, before rounding off with my 
conclusions in Chapter V.
1.1: An Evolutionary Science of Religion
Darwin’s  realization that  species evolve through natural  selection stands today as one of  the 
paramount discoveries of science, and not surprisingly, researchers in other fields were keen to 
incorporate  his  findings.  Early  forays  proved far  too  simplistic,  however,  and  the  notion of 
religion as but an intermediary stage on the way to a scientific world view did not sit well with 
an increased awareness  of  the need for an emic perspective.  Although simplistic,  teleological 
models of evolution are unheard of and have been for a very long time, it would take almost a 
century for social and evolutionary sciences to cross paths again. Two important books were 
published in 1975: One was E. O. Wilson’s Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (E. O. Wilson 1975), 
which marked the beginning of a new field studying social behaviour in light of evolution, and 
the  other  was  Dan Sperber’s  Rethinking  Symbolism (Sperber  1975),  which  foreshadowed the 
Cognitive  Science  of  Religion  (CSR),  named  after  Stewart  Guthrie’s  paper  (Guthrie  1980). 
Sociobiology was a  more general  field,  and its  most  important  contribution to evolutionary 
sciences of religion seems to be in clearing the ground for new perspectives, such as evolutionary 
psychology.  While  sociobiology  has  been  hailed  as  ‘one  of  the  scientific  triumphs  of  the 
twentieth century’  (Hagen 2005, 167), nothing much happened in CSR until  the early 1990s, 
when a spate of books (Atran 1990; Lawson and McCauley 1990; Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby 
1992; Guthrie 1993; Boyer 1994) was published, launching the field in earnest.
Generally, these scientists advocate a move away from an understanding of the mind as an all-
purpose problem solver, and rather view it as a patchwork formed by evolution gradually adding 
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purpose-specific  modules.  According  to  proponents  of  CSR,  this  combination  of  specialised 
subsystems prepares us for religion in several ways  (Jensen 2009, 129). Already here there is a 
radical departure from more traditional ways of studying religion—in fact,  it  is  not so much 
religion  that  is  being studied  as  the  mind itself  (Jensen 2009;  Saler  2008).  Perhaps  the  most 
important claims concern so-called minimally counter-intuitive concepts (MCI, Boyer 2001) and 
hard-to-fake signalling  (Irons 2001). MCI refers to what anthropologist Pascal Boyer claims is a 
cognitive  optimum,  that  is,  ‘a  concept  that  is  both  attention-grabbing  and  that  allows  rich 
inferences’  (Boyer 2001, 86). By this he means that by slightly violating our expectations about 
how  members  of  an  ontological  category  (such  as  person,  plant,  or  animal)  should  be, 
conceptions of gods and magical objects command our attention,  so long as they are not so 
counter-intuitive  that  we  cannot  remember  them.  Hard-to-fake  signals,  on  the  other  hand, 
expand on a concept well established in biology, namely costly signalling. The idea, very briefly,  
is that religious behaviour signals group commitment, which is assumed to be a requirement for 
cooperation to evolve in the face of possible exploitation by free riders, who do not contribute to 
the  group.  Limiting  cooperation  to  those  who  display  commitment  to  the  group  through 
extensive religious ritual is supposed to deter free riders, so that investments in the group is not 
squandered. This, too, is made possible by the way the brain works: faking commitment is hard, 
because merely going through the motions of religious ritual tend to make practitioners religious,  
and as such incorporate the group’s values of cooperation (Bulbulia 2008).
While CSR focuses on how biological evolution has prepared humans for religion, there is also 
a  slowly  increasing  awareness  that  culture  is  as  much  capable  of  evolving  as  the  biological 
substrate it depends on. Arguably, the most important work on this has been done on culture in 
general, rather than religion especially, but some traces can be found in studies of religion (D. S.  
Wilson  2002,  119;  Boyer  2001,  273–287;  Feierman  2009;  Geertz  2010;  2011;  Geertz  and 
Markússon 2010; Jensen 2002). Cultural evolution is especially relevant when considering religion 
as an adaptation, as religion could turn out not to be a direct biological adaptation or by-product 
at all, but rather a cultural adaptation. I will argue that scholars studying religion need to pay 
more  attention  to  cultural  evolution.  A note  on  terminology  before  we continue:  I  see  the 
Cognitive Science of Religion as a subset of evolutionary approaches to studying religion. Some 
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theorists, perhaps more typically those who view religion as an adaptation, are rightly identified 
with evolutionary approaches, while not necessarily CSR. I will not pay much attention to the 
distinction here, as it is not at issue. Rather, I will speak generally of evolutionary approaches to 
(the study/science of) religion, unless the distinction is particularly relevant. 
1.2: Adaptations
Though  often  equated  with  evolution,  natural  selection  is  not  the  only  mechanism  of 
evolutionary  change.  Three  other  prominent  mechanisms  are  mutation,  migration  and  drift 
(Freeman and Herron 2007, 141). Mutation is ‘the process by which genetic material undergoes a 
detectable and heritable structural change, or the result of such a change’ (Cammack 2006). As it 
pays no attention to evolved adaptations, is generally detrimental to fitness, although on average 
not by much (Freeman and Herron 2007, 151). Migration is ‘transfer of alleles from the gene pool 
of one population to the gene pool of another population’  (Freeman and Herron 2007, 225). 
Genetic  drift  is  ‘irregular,  random  fluctuations  in  gene  frequency  in  a  (relatively)  small 
population  caused by statistical  effects’  (Cammack 2006).  In  other  words,  it  is  the  effect  of  
random happenings on the gene pool, or more technically, sampling errors as a consequence of 
the gene pool being finite (Freeman and Herron 2007, 234). Genetic drift reduces variation and 
changes population gene frequencies from one generation to the next, and hence is an agent of  
evolution. In small populations, it can be a very significant agent, sometimes even overwhelming 
natural selection (Hedrick 2011, 187). The important lesson here is that neither drift, migration 
nor mutation correlate with  performance; they will not favour a beneficial gene. Instead, only 
natural selection is capable of producing and refining adaptations (Of course, the very first stages 
of all  adaptations are  initially produced by mutation,  but  on the whole,  mutation is  not  an 
adaptive  process  as  most  mutations  are  neutral  or  detrimental).  Accordingly,  a  common 
definition  is  that  a  trait  is  an  adaptation  if  it  ‘performs  a  function  that  is  of  utility  to  the 
organisms  possessing  it  and  if  the  character  evolved  by  natural  selection  for  that  particular 
function’ (Larson and Losos 1996). Note that functions are selected for utility in the first place, so 
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that  this  definition  is  really  all  about  natural  selection,  but  combining  two  elements:  
functionality and selective history. 
Perhaps the concept of natural selection needs a bit of clarifying before we move on. Generally 
speaking, natural selection is the differential survival and reproduction of entities. I use ‘entities’ 
rather than the standard ‘alleles’ (genes competing for the same chromosomal slot) to allow for 
natural  selection  acting  on  more  than  just  genes,  such  as  cultural  selection.  Genes  are  not 
required for selection to work, but rather variation, heredity and differential fitness (Dennett 1995, 
343). It is easy enough to understand what variation is, but an important point is that whatever 
variation exists  must be linked to heredity and differential  fitness.  Heredity of course  is  the  
property  of  an  entity  to  be  able  to  pass  its  characteristics,  largely  intact,  on  to  the  next  
generation. Differential  fitness means that the existing variation in characteristics is linked to  
performance, that is, some characteristics are better adapted to solve the problems posed by the 
environment. In other words,  if  a  population of entities exhibit  heritable variation in fitness, 
whether it might be a population of genes, groups, or elements of culture, the fittest entities will  
prosper at the expense of the least fit, and this is natural selection. However, the term ‘selection’  
appears in several theoretical constructs, and it is perhaps necessary to point out that it is not 
used in the same way in all of these. The following list of four kinds of uses does not claim to be 
exhaustive, nor does it include all relevant subtypes. To begin with, there are concepts such as 
‘artificial selection’ and ‘sexual selection.’ These are forms of natural selection, in that they speak 
of different selective regimes. Where in natural selection, nature sets the premise for what traits 
will be selected, these premises can also be artificial or sexual.1 For example, in nature it might be 
advantageous to outrun a predator, whereas in artificial selection it is advantageous to outrun 
competing greyhounds, to be selected for breeding. Sexual selection will be treated in more detail 
below,  but  for  now,  it  will  suffice  to  say  that  it  is  a  selective  regime  wherein  mate  choice 
determines  which  traits  are  fittest.  Neither  of  these,  of  course,  eliminate  natural  selection—
sterility, for example, will always be selected against whatever the breeder or mate thinks about  
it.
1  One might of course argue that artificial and sexual regimes are as much part of nature as anything else, but the 
terms provide clarity as the selective mechanisms are rather different.
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Another use  of  ‘selection’  is  in concepts such as  ‘group selection’  and ‘cultural  selection.’  
Rather than specifying selective regimes, these terms are concerned with the  units of selection. 
The term ‘natural selection’ does not specify this—most commonly, it is genes (or rather alleles),  
but  as  mentioned earlier,  anything can in principle  be selected;  individuals,  cells,  groups,  or 
cultural  elements.  Cultural  and  group  selection  are  controversial  processes,  not  in  that  the 
principle is in dispute, but in that they are often seen to be too weak to be of any significance 
(Williams 1966, 108; E. A. Lloyd 2007, 47). However, I aim to show that they are both viable (2.2 
below), and that they may indeed play an important part in the evolution of religion (3.2, 3.4,  
4.2, 4.4).
A third way to use selection is found in  patterns of selection, such as ‘directional selection,’ 
‘stabilising/balancing selection’ and ‘disruptive selection’ (Freeman and Herron 2007, 347). These 
can be distinguished by the outcome of selection, particularly on quantifiable traits, such as size 
and speed. Under directional selection, fitness is proportional (or inversely proportional) to the 
value of a trait, so that the value either increases or decreases over time. Trophy hunting leading  
to reduction of horn size is one example of this (Coltman et al. 2011). Stabilising selection refers 
to situations where intermediate values of a trait are the fittest, and disruptive selection is where 
extreme values are most fit, whether they are high or low, so that the population ends up divided  
in two opposite groups of roughly equal fitness. Stabilising selection can be found for example in 
birth weight, as smaller infants are less prepared for life outside the womb, and larger infants are 
more susceptible to birth trauma (Ulijaszek, Johnston, and Preece 1998, 367). An example of 
disruptive  selection  is  where  large  and  small,  but  not  intermediate,  bill  sizes  in  birds  are 
preferred, to specialise in different seeds (T. B. Smith 1993).
A  fourth  way  to  speak  of  selection,  is  in  mechanisms such  as  ‘runaway  selection’  and 
‘frequency-dependent  selection.’  These  specify  how  selection  operates  in  particular  cases. 
Runaway selection is the positive feedback loop we get when a trait under selection influences the 
selective  regime  so  that  demand  for  that  trait  increases,  often  resulting  in  preposterously 
exaggerated  traits.  Runaway  selection  is  often  coupled  with  sexual  selection,  the  canonical 
example  being  the  peacocks’  extravagant  tail  (Zahavi  1975).  This  tail  signals  good  health  to 
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peahens, so that peahens with a preference for these tails will have fitter offspring. Because of the 
inherent feedback dynamic, this leads to runaway selection: Offspring of such couples inherit  
both  the  extravagant  tail  of  their  father  and  a  preference  for  such  tails  from their  mother,  
resulting in a genetic correlation between the two  (Freeman and Herron 2007).  As one trait 
increases in strength, so does the other—often with preposterous results, as in the two millimetre  
long bug Micronecta scholtzi, capable of underwater calls at just below 100 dB (Sueur, Mackie, 
and Windmill  2011).  Frequency-dependent  selection is  where  the  fitness  of  a  particular  trait 
depends on how common it is in the population, and can be divided into negative and positive 
frequency-dependence. In the former, rare traits are selected for as long as they are rare, at which 
point selection favours competing traits. In the latter, traits benefit from being common. An 
astonishing example of negative frequency-dependence is found in the scale-eating cichlid of Lake 
Tanganyika, Perissodus microlepis (Hori 1993). These fish have an asymmetry in their jaw so that 
they prefer attacking from left or right, depending on the way their jaw twists. Their prey is  
generally  alert,  but  particularly  vigilant  against  attacks  from the  side  where  they have  been 
attacked previously, that is, where the most common morph of cichlid attacks. This increases the 
fitness of the rarer morph, until their pray start looking to the other side, and the cycle repeats.  
In such situations, evolution cannot settle on an optimal trait, because as the trait approaches  
fixation, fitness decreases. Rather, such frequency-dependence leads to the evolution of what is 
called an evolutionary stable state (ESS: Maynard Smith 1982, 204). This state is an equilibrium 
where both (or all) competing traits have the same fitness. More will be said on evolutionary 
stable  states  and  strategies  in  the  treatment  of  the  Prisoner’s  dilemma below (3.2).  Positive  
frequency-dependence,  on the other  hand,  is  found for example in warning coloration.  Such 
signalling is not really advantageous until it is so common that a significant number of would-be 
predators recognise it and stay away (Darst and Cummings 2006). The evolution of any kind of 
signalling, in fact, would be an example of positive frequency dependence, including the hard-to-
fake signalling of commitment that will be discussed further below (3.2, 4.2).
It  is  worth  pointing  out  that  although  selection  is  generally  considered  to  give  rise  to  
adaptations,  the  extravagant  traits  formed  by  runaway  selection  and  the  compromises  of 
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evolutionary stable states or strategies are generally suboptimal solutions. In a sense, they are  
examples of selection becoming too greedy and not quitting while it is still ahead. Still, these 
solutions are considered adaptations, because the optimal solutions are unstable. Peafowls would, 
on average, be fitter without their extravagant tail, but those peafowls who managed to signal  
fitness or detect such signals would be fitter still,  and in this way handicaps are selected for; 
adaptations and maladaptations both, depending on your outlook. This will be discussed further 
in the chapter on biology (2.5), with implications for the evolution of religious cooperation later 
(4.2).
So,  traits  selected  for  their  current  function  are  adaptations,  although they could  still  be 
suboptimal. But environments constantly change, and so do demands, so traits could well find 
new functions. Beneficial traits, when not considering their evolutionary history, are generally 
said to be adaptations, but for cases where a beneficial trait lacks a selective history for its current  
use, palaeontologists Stephen Jay Gould and Elizabeth Vrba coined the term ‘exaptation’ (Gould 
and  Vrba  1982).  Philosopher  of  biology  Daniel  Dennett,  however,  argues  that  the  term  is 
superfluous,  as  ‘no function is  eternal;  if  you go back far  enough,  you will  find that  every 
adaptation has developed out of predecessor structures each of which either had some other use 
or no use at all’ (Dennett 1995, 281). Biologists John Endler and Tracy McLellan exclude the  
historical  aspect  altogether  and call  traits  adaptations based on their  current  contribution to 
fitness, arguing that ‘as soon as a new function for a trait occurs, natural selection will affect that  
trait in a new way and change the allele frequencies that generate that trait’ (Endler and McLellan 
1988,  409).  When  even  biologists  cannot  agree  on  the  definition  of  adaptation,  scholars  of 
religion should tread carefully when adopting the term, more so, I will argue, than they have thus 
far done.
Thus far, we have concentrated on selection. But as mentioned at the outset, selection is not 
the only force of evolution. One of the major controversies of evolutionary biology arose when 
Gould  and  Richard  Lewontin,  in  their  paper  ‘The  Spandrels  of  San  Marco’  attacked  ‘the 
Panglossian paradigm,’ claiming that selection had unduly been considered the sole mechanism of 
evolutionary change (Gould and Lewontin 1979). They agreed that it was the most important 
one (Ibid., 589), but stressed the importance of developmental constraints in limiting selection, to 
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the point where they ‘become much the most interesting aspect of evolution’ (Ibid., 594). A good 
three decades later, it appears that the adaptationist side has endured the ensuing controversy 
relatively  unscathed,  but  with  the  new  subject  matter  provided  by  expanding  evolutionary 
approaches to the social sciences, another look might well be warranted.
1.3: The Adaptationist Program
The ‘Panglossian paradigm’ is more aptly called the adaptationist program, although it is not a 
unified group, but rather a catch-all for several different approaches to evolution that focus on 
adaptation  as  the  most  important  evolutionary  force.  Peter  Godfrey-Smith  recognises  three  
different kinds (Godfrey-Smith 2001), and Tim Lewens further divide these into seven (Lewens 
2008).  Arguably  the  most  important  difference  is  between  merely  pragmatic  forms  of 
adaptationism and making the claim that adaptation is in fact the correct explanation for most, 
or all existing traits.
Not  accepting  Gould  and  Lewontin’s  allegations,  defenders  of  the  adaptationist  program 
claimed the default assumption of adaptation as their strength. Philosopher David Resnik claims 
that  assuming traits  to be adaptations is  not  even a hypothesis  that would be repudiated by 
finding  other  mechanisms  to  be  more  important,  but  rather  a  heuristic,  the  best  way  of  
examining  traits  (Resnik  1997).  This  is  a  slight  modification  of  Elliott  Sober’s  claim  that 
adaptationism should be viewed as a research program (Sober 2000, 132). Resnik disagrees ‘on 
how that research program should be characterised and justified’ (Resnik 1997, 41), arguing that 
even if it should turn out that most traits are not adaptations (a scenario, we should remember,  
not  even  Gould  and  Lewontin  envisioned),  we  simply  do  not  have  any  alternative  research 
methods (Ibid., 43). What is also interesting to note, is that it has even been suggested that an 
adaptationist approach makes the best sense out of developmental constraints, the very problem 
that Gould and Lewontin were interested in (Orzack and Sober 2001, 84; Seger and Stubblefield 
1996, 113; Dennett 1995, 232). As biologists David Stephens and John Krebs (1986, 212) point  
out, ‘[e]ven if they serve no other purpose, well-formulated design models are needed to identify 
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constraints: without a design hypothesis there would be no basis for postulating any kind of 
constraint!’
Another  aspect  of  the rebuttal  of  ‘Spandrels’ is  the  claim that  natural  selection is  such a 
powerful force of evolution that the effect of developmental constraints or other complications 
are negligible (Sober 2000, 122). This does not mean that other forces do not exist, but rather, 
that adaptationism provides sufficient explanations (Ibid., 124). Dennett even argues that ‘not 
only do “over”-simplified models often actually explain just what needs explaining, but no more 
complicated model could do the job’ (Dennett 1995, 102, italics in original). Or, as put even more 
succinctly by John Ball, although not in quite the same context: 
To make progress in understanding all this, we probably need to begin with simplified (oversimplified?) models 
and ignore the critics’ tirade that the real world is more complex. The real world is always more complex, which 
has the advantage that we shan’t run out of work. (Ball 1984, 159)
Resnik is open to the possibility that we one day might find adaptationism ‘foolish, but right 
now it is the best we can do’ (Resnik 1997, 43). While different in flavour, pragmatic approaches 
such  as  these  seem  to  dominate  evolutionary  biology,  rather  than  the  stronger  form  of 
adaptationism claiming that most or all traits in fact are adaptations (Lewens 2008, 168).
There is an important caveat to all this, however. While the assumption of adaptation might 
be the optimal search strategy, we should not invoke adaptation when more basic explanations  
are available (Williams 1966; Dennett 1995, 247). Physics takes precedence over adaptation—leaves 
do  not  fall  down because  they  have  been  selected  to  do  so,  but  because  of  gravity.  More 
interestingly, developmental constraints and by-products also take precedence over adaptation: If 
a trait can indeed be explained in terms of one of these, then it should not be explained as an  
adaptation. This does not conflict with using adaptationism as our initial hypothesis; rather, it 
means simply that  if we find a more basic explanation, we should prefer it. Nor does it imply 
anything about the prevalence of developmental constraints or by-products, only that for the 
cases that are constrained, or by-products of something else, adaptation is irrelevant. Compare 
with Tim Lewens’ observation that while adaptationists explain ‘the non-appearance of form F* 
by pointing out that it is less fit than the actual F, [structuralists explain] this non-appearance by  
claiming that F* cannot arise (or is very unlikely to arise) by mutation from the existing system’ 
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(Lewens 2008, 175). For any given trait where it happens that the structuralist explanation is 
correct, and the existing trait is the only available trait, we should not be calling it an adaptation.
Having made clear what an adaptation is, we now turn to the science that has studied it the 
longest, biology, in the hope that this can inform our further studies of religion.

II  
ADAPTATION IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY
hether one considers selection to be the only evolutionary force worth 
mentioning, or seek to challenge it by focusing rather on developmental 
constraints,  it’s hard to argue that adaptation isn’t  the  central theme of 
evolutionary biology. The discussions pertaining to it are, however, quite different from 
those  of  evolutionary  approaches  to  religion.  The  spandrel controversy  did  of  course 
originate in biology, but now that the dust has more or less settled, the adaptationists seem 
mostly unscathed. Nevertheless, no treatment of adaptation would be complete without a 
review of this controversy, which will be found below (2.1).
W
A more pressing disagreement concerns multilevel selection, re-emerging in recent years 
as a viable alternative to the conventional view of the last decades, favouring selection at the 
level of genes. From the mid-sixties and onwards, the argument was driven home that only 
genes had the properties required to function as units of selection (Williams 1966; Dawkins 
2006). The then-common assumption that selection could act for the good of the species 
was to be the subject of ridicule, with only a minority still investigating selection at the  
level of groups. With heredity centred on genes, higher levels were seen to be too unstable 
for  selection on them to work.  Multilevel  selection has  been gaining ground in recent 
decades, but note that the current theories are much more sophisticated than they used to 
be; groups need to meet certain requirements to be evolvable, and the entire species is never 
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seriously considered an adaptive unit, although commentators on television’s nature shows don’t 
quite seem to have caught up, as many biologists will complain (Bass 1994, 112; Carey 2003, 219; 
Breed and Moore 2011, 6).
A thorough examination of adaptation also requires clarification of a number of related terms, 
chief among them fitness. Roughly, biological fitness corresponds to a gene’s relative success at  
spreading copies of itself. While often taken to be a property of individuals, as in the phrase  
‘survival of the fittest,’ a closer look at the concept will show that fitness is not as easily defined  
as often assumed (Dawkins 1999, ch. 10).
Fourth, I will discuss constraints on optimality—mechanisms that limit evolution’s ability to 
ascend the premier summits of adaptation. Optimality is constrained by the path evolution has 
thus far taken, and better solutions may be out of reach. Another constraint is time lag. The 
wheels of evolution grind slowly, and if the environment is changing too fast, the population 
cannot  possibly  be  perfectly  adapted.  The  adaptation  of  yesteryear  may  prove  not  merely 
inefficient in new environments, it could be positively maladaptive. There are several other ways 
evolution  can  produce  suboptimal  traits,  to  be  presented  below  (2.4).  I  will  also  discuss  
mechanisms that balance these, such as genetic drift as a way to cross adaptive valleys.
In the final section of this chapter, I will examine processes where selection itself produces 
suboptimal traits, or maladaptive behaviour. Mechanisms that can produce such traits are arms 
races, runaway selection, evolutionarily stable strategies and extended phenotypes. Arms races 
and runaway selection are similar in that both keep raising the stakes without increasing the 
benefit, evolutionarily stable strategies are compromises where more cooperative solutions would 
be  vulnerable  to  exploitation,  and  some  forms  of  extended  phenotypes  are  cases  where  an 
organism is being manipulated by another. The three first mechanisms can lead to maladaptive 
behaviour  because  evolution  lacks  foresight,  and  selects  traits  that  are  fittest  of  the  current  
options, but in the long run detrimental. Extended phenotypes can be adaptations par excellence, 
but  often not  for  the  organism that  possess  the  trait  in  question—another  organism can be 
manipulating the former to its own benefit.
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2.1: Spandrels
One  major  controversy  in  evolutionary  biology 
during  the  final  quarter  of  the  twentieth  century 
arose  not  from  an  organic  life  form,  but  rather 
architectural  details  of  Venice’s  Basilica  di  San 
Marco.  According  to  Gould  and  Lewontin, 
spandrels are ‘the tapering triangular spaces formed 
by the intersection of two rounded arches at right 
angles’  (Gould  and  Lewontin  1979,  581).1 These 
were to haunt evolutionary biology for years, as a 
metaphor  for  ‘a  nonadaptive  architectural  by-
product of definite and necessary form—a structure 
of  predictable  size  and  shape  that  then  becomes 
available  for  later  and  secondary  utility’  (Gould 
1997, 10751). Concerning religion, spandrels are invoked by scientists claiming religion to be a by-
product of other adaptations; In the chapter on religion, I will use ‘by-product’ when I might has 
well have used ‘spandrel,’ as the former term is more commonly used in that regard. Be that as it  
may, Gould and Lewontin proposed that spandrels were necessary by-products of mounting a 
dome on rounded arches, neglecting existing alternative designs demonstrating that spandrels are  
not necessary at all, but in fact adaptations (Dennett 1995, 273).
Perhaps we should ignore this arguably feeble metaphor and focus on the core of Gould and 
Lewontin’s argument: That developmental constraints riddle nature with by-products, competing 
with natural selection for prominence in evolution. They argued that evolutionary biologists ‘in  
their  tendency  to  focus  on  immediate  adaptation  to  local  conditions,  do  tend  to  ignore 
architectural constraints and perform … inversions of explanation [in the style of Voltaire’s Dr. 
1 Dennett (1995, 272) disputes even the term’s architectural origin, claiming that what Gould and Lewontin calls 
‘spandrels’ are properly termed ‘pendentives.’ While the former term has evidently been used in both senses, 
Dennett seems to be correct in arguing that the three-dimensional spaces Gould and Lewontin are writing about are 
properly called pendentives, while spandrels are two-dimensional (Britton and Godwin 1838; C. M. Harris 1977; J. 
H. Parker 2004).
Spandrels, or pendentives, in San Marco di Venezia. Photo: 
Ricardo  André  Frantz.  Licensed  under  the  Creative 
Commons  Attribution-Share  Alike  2.5  Generic  license. 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Veneza118.jpg
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Pangloss, the preposterous eternal optimist]’ (Gould and Lewontin 1979, 583). However, even 
when disregarding the  failed metaphor,  the  argument  against  ‘pervasive  adaptation’  does  not 
stand up to scrutiny.
A significant part of the critique in ‘Spandrels’ is levelled at what they call ‘just so stories,’ a 
term  borrowed  from  Rudyard  Kipling’s  fanciful  tales  of  the  origin  of  various  phenomena 
(Kipling 1902). ‘[P]lausible stories can always be told,’ they argue (Gould and Lewontin 1979, 
588), suggesting that adaptationists just make up stories that seem to fit the fact and are content 
with that. But two can play at that game, and the error is just as easy to commit on behalf of  
spandrelism (Brandon 1990; Pigliucci and Kaplan 2000, 68). However, selection is easier to work 
with  than  non-selective  forces,  and  an  adaptationist  hypothesis  can  provide  a  valuable  and 
economical ‘first guess’ (D. S. Wilson 2002, 70). When the preliminary work has been done, 
Sober, following Parker (1992), has a suggestion: ‘If optimality explanations are too easy to invent,  
let’s make the problem harder’ (Sober 2000, 137, italics in original). The solution is to lay down a 
specific criterion of optimality for a given behaviour, rather than just ask why that behaviour 
takes place, and then get empirical support for the explanation. If a study can show that key 
variables are very near the optimum for some task, then it becomes difficult to say that natural 
selection has been constrained in that particular case, although the reverse is true as well. While  
this is true for particular cases, adaptationism itself, like Sober writes, ‘is testable only in the long  
run’ (Sober 2000, 131).
Other themes of ‘Spandrels’ are genetic drift, genetic correlations, developmental constraints 
and  fitness  landscapes  with  multiple  adaptive  peaks.  These  are  all  standard  constraints  to 
consider,  and  all  Gould  and  Lewontin  did,  was  to  stress  their  importance.  The  relative 
significance  of  different  evolutionary  mechanisms  is  arguably  what  most  disagreements  in 
evolution are about, so ‘Spandrels’ is not unique in that regard. At any rate, these issues will be 
treated in the section on constraints, below (2.4).
One problem is that Gould and Lewontin are attacking a straw man: adaptationists are well  
aware of developmental constraints, which are ‘an integral part of (good) adaptationist reasoning’ 
(Dennett 1995, 270). Increased emphasis on constraints may well be warranted, but this would 
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not be the paradigm shift Gould and Lewontin might seem to think it would be. Even the style  
of argument has been criticised for being overly rhetorical, one-sided, and provocative, rather 
than stimulating constructive debate (Borgia 1994). One of the shortcomings of ‘Spandrels’ is  
particularly notable: according to Dennett, there are not even any official definitions of the term 
‘spandrel’ as it pertains to biology (Dennett 1995, 275).2 He charitably tries out a few possible 
definitions, none of which amount to any threat to adaptationism. As he comments, ‘it is never a 
mistake to ask the adaptationist’s “why” question, even when the true answer is that there is no 
reason’ (Ibid., 276). Ironically, none other than Richard Lewontin has expressed himself to much 
the same effect:  ‘In a sense,  then,  biologists  are  forced to the extreme adaptationist  program 
because the alternatives, although they are undoubtedly operative in many cases, are untestable’  
(Lewontin 1978, 125).
Here we arrive at what in my opinion is the strongest defence against the ‘Spandrels’ article, 
namely that presented by David Resnik (1997). He argues that adaptationism is a heuristic, not a  
hypothesis,  and  as  such  that  it  is  independent  of  the  truth  value  of  the  adaptationist  
metahypothesis. A central point, similar to Lewontin’s, just quoted, is that evolution ‘is a very 
complex process and it may be useful to make some simplifying (though false) assumptions about 
this process in order to understand it’ (Resnik 1997). Perhaps, then, adaptationism with large 
strides and the occasional misstep is preferable to a spandrelist approach that is too complex to 
get anywhere at all.
2.2: Multilevel Selection
Theories of religion sometimes invoke selection at levels other than that of genes, such as groups 
or culture.  This  is  not  uncontroversial,  and has  been discussed  thoroughly in biology.  Early 
biologists  often  suggested  that  evolution  works  for  the  good  of  the  species,  a  view heavily 
criticised by G. C. Williams (1966). This view was later to become the central theme of one of  
the  best-selling  books  on  biology,  Richard  Dawkins’  The  Selfish  Gene  (1976/2006).  Briefly, 
proponents of this gene-centred view of evolution argue that evolution works on genes and genes 
2 Note that Gould’s definition, cited above, was published after Dennett’s complaint, not in ‘Spandrels.’
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only, because genes, unlike organisms and species, persist over evolutionary time. The composite  
entities which contain genes, such as individuals, groups, populations and species are all unique, 
and according to Dawkins, ‘you cannot get evolution by selecting between entities when there is 
only one copy of each entity!’ (Dawkins 2006, 34). Dawkins defines his selective unit, the gene, as 
‘a piece of chromosome which is sufficiently short for it to last, potentially, for long enough for it 
to function as a significant unit of natural selection’ (Ibid., 35–36, italics in original). It must be 
short to minimise the chance that it’s split apart by crossing over during meiosis, which is the 
mixture of parental chromosomes during sexual reproduction (Freeman and Herron 2007, 306). 
One example to show that evolution does not favour the good of the species can be found in  
sex ratios (Fisher 1930, 141–142). Since males are able to mate with a large number of females, and 
indeed in many species do, at the expense of weaker rivals, a species with a lower ratio of males 
would be able to keep up the same level of reproduction. If all the calories taken up by the excess  
males (who typically also consume more than females) could have been diverted to even more 
females, a species that could sustain a low ratio of males would seem to be favoured by selection,  
as the same resources would be divided among, on average, less resource-demanding individuals.  
The reason this does not happen, is that in such a group, it would pay to be male. Since each  
male statistically would have more offspring than any given female, genes that increased the ratio 
of males would spread, until the familiar equilibrium is reached. The example shows that the 
interests of the genes prevail over the interests of the species, since mutinous (‘selfish’) genes can 
invade a population, to its peril.
As this gene-centred view gained currency, it did so almost at the complete detriment of group 
selectionist views. A few persisted, however, and in recent years it has begun to seem that they  
were right after all, though their theories are far more refined than naïve ‘good of the species’ 
assumptions. Multilevel selection is a better approach than group selection, as no one disputes 
that genes can drive evolution, and groups of course exist at different levels, from cells to species 
(Alexander and Borgia 2011). To be fair, no one really disagrees that selection is possible at any  
level, but ardent gene selectionists hold that selection at the level of the gene is so powerful as to  
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cancel out all other selection. Pioneer of the gene selectionist view, George C. Williams writes 
that
Like the theory of genic selection, the theory of group selection is logically a tautology and there can be no sane  
doubt about the reality of the process. Rational criticism must center on the importance of the process and on its 
adequacy in explaining the phenomena attributed to it (Williams 1966, 108)
Dawkins’ argument for the gene selectionist view is tied up with his interpretation of evolution 
as the differential survival of replicators. A replicator is ‘any entity in the universe which interacts 
with its world, including other replicators, in such a way that copies of itself are made’ (Dawkins  
1978, 67). These entities have three qualities: (1) copying fidelity, (2) fecundity, and (3) longevity 
(Dawkins 2006, 17). In other words, they replicate (1) faithfully, with few errors—just enough to 
keep some variation on which selection can work. They also produce (2) more copies than are 
needed for simple replacement, so that a successful variant is able to spread, and they (3) last for 
long enough to replicate themselves. Dawkins argues that only genes are replicators (in biology, 
leaving the door open for memes in culture) (Dawkins 1999, ch. 6),  and that organisms and 
groups are only vehicles in which replicators move about (Ibid., 82). 
Without too much controversy, we can admit some selective power to other levels as well. A 
study  of  yeast  (Saccharomyces  cerevisiae)  showed  that  at  the  level  of  mitochondrial  genomes 
within the cells,  parasitic mitochondria  are  favoured over normal mitochondria  because they 
replicate faster.  At the level of  yeast cells  within a petri  dish,  however,  selection favours  the 
opposite  (Taylor,  Zeyl,  and  Cooke  2002).  Without  getting  into  biological  technicalities  well  
beyond the scope of this chapter, suffice it to say that the experiment confirmed that depending  
on  the  conditions,  selection  can  and  does  operate  at  different  levels.  However,  we  are  not 
concerned here with the levels of cells and mitochondria. Can selection at even higher levels also 
be a force significant enough that we cannot ignore it?
Yes, say a growing number of evolutionary scientists. The evolutionary mathematician Martin 
Nowak, in his recent, seminal work on cooperation and evolution, argues that the math behind 
group selection is sound (Nowak and Highfield 2011, ch. 4). Not only does he maintain that 
Dawkins’ claim about selfishness as an important driving force behind evolution is irrelevant to 
group  selection,  which  ‘simply  says  that  intense  between-group  competition  will  favour 
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mechanisms  that  blur  the  distinction  between group and  individual  welfare  if  they  improve 
performance or fitness at the group level’ (Ibid., 93). Environmental scientist Peter J. Richerson 
and anthropologist Robert Boyd have developed a ‘tribal social instincts hypothesis’ (Richerson 
and  Boyd  2005),  arguing  that  pressures  to  conform decrease  within-group  differences  while 
symbolic boundaries increase between-group differences, enabling groups to function as selective 
units rather than loose collections of individuals (Richerson and Newson 2008). Biologist David 
Sloan  Wilson has  a  somewhat  different  angle,  assuming  that  individuals  take  part  in  several 
different  trait-groups,  so  called  because  they  are  founded  on  a  specific  trait  shared  among 
members  (D.  S.  Wilson 1975).  Within  each  of  these  groups,  altruism has  lower fitness  than 
selfishness, but groups with more altruists have higher fitness than more selfish groups. 
Whether selection is mostly confined to the genetic level, or if group selection is an important 
factor,  too, is relevant for adaptation studies because adaptations at the level of genes will be 
markedly different from adaptations at the level of groups, as they may have conflicting interests. 
In cases where there is no conflict between levels, it is probably best to stick to a gene-centred 
model, even though group selection could explain the phenomena just as well (Williams 1966, 4). 
Note that a central point of The Selfish Gene was the claim that even though genes are favoured 
over organisms and groups, and even though these genes are best described as if they were selfish 
(without, of course,  ascribing any real motivations to them), altruistic behaviour is still  fully 
evolvable. We would, however, expect more cooperative behaviour from group selection than 
from gene selection (Bulbulia and Frean 2009, 189). There is a twist to this, though—altruism 
within the group often implies increased between-group competition (Bowles 2006). But even if 
we were all agreed as to what level or levels selection takes place, there is still another important  
lesson from multilevel thinking, implicit in the very debate. The only reason we can talk about  
different  levels  of  selection is  that  they can select  in  different  directions.  As  in  the  sex  rate 
example  above,  genes  and  groups  can  have  different  ‘interests.’  For  groups  to  prosper,  the 
individuals  composing  it  should  be  relatively  altruistic,  but  selfish  individuals  are  likely  to 
outperform altruists. Generalising, we can probably say that for any given level of selection, it is  
advantageous that the parts composing a unit at that level are altruistic, while the unit itself is  
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selfish towards other units at the same level. We must be careful, when stating that something is  
an  adaptation,  to  specify  at  which  level,  and  remember  that  it  can  be  quite  maladaptive  at 
another.
2.3: Fitness
Fitness is so integral to the debate on adaptation that it warrants its own section here. The two 
terms ‘adaptedness’ and ‘fitness’ are directly related, although not interchangeable. One could 
perhaps suggest that an increase in fitness is the function of evolution, and adaptedness is the 
means to attain the former. Another way to put it, is Elliott Sober’s observation that adaptation 
‘looks to the past, reflecting the kind of history that a trait has had. [Fitness] looks to the future, 
indicating the chances that organisms have for survival and reproductive success’ (Sober 1984, 
210).  As  such,  one  would  expect  the  two  to  be  correlated,  and  indeed  they  typically  are. 
Exceptions are, for instance, when a foreign species successfully invades a habitat to which it is 
not historically adapted (Keller and Taylor 2008). Some traits experience increases in fitness as 
their host species escape natural enemies and parasites (Torchin et al. 2003), although to say that  
they are  adapted to  the  environment  in  which  they have  just  arrived is  clearly  false.  Other 
examples are when adaptations in the long run are detrimental to fitness, as discussed below (2.5).
While the term ‘fitness’ does seem to have explanatory power, and consequently should be 
defined so that it can be used in precise measurements, Dawkins argues that it has done little  
more than to cause a great deal of confusion (Dawkins 1999, ch. 10). He describes no less than  
five  different  uses  of  the  term (plus  a  brief  mention of  a  couple  more),  and  it  is  his  main 
contention that even prominent scientists have been confusing these. The confusion surrounding 
fitness has led to demonstrable error, and furthermore, has led outside commentators to conclude 
that the entire theory of evolution is nothing more than a tautology (An objection which now 
seems  limited  to  creationists).  The  five  different  formulations  of  fitness  are,  briefly:  non-
technical, population-genetic, classical, inclusive, and personal fitness.3
3  Dawkins does not give names for the first two types of fitness, and so I have given them my own, based on his 
text.
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The first usage originates with Spencer, Wallace, and Darwin, and was not concerned with 
reproductive success as such, but rather with the traits required by specific habitats. For instance,  
if the selective environment requires a lot of running, fit individuals will be those with strong leg 
muscles. This is a non-technical usage that really is out of fashion, but it has similar disadvantages 
to classical fitness, discussed below.
A more precise usage is found in population genetics, where it ‘may be regarded as a measure  
of the number of offspring that a typical individual of genotype  Aa is expected to bring up to 
reproductive age, when all other variation is averaged out’ (Ibid., 182). Note that with all other 
variation  averaged  out,  it  is  really  the  trait’s  performance  that  is  being  measured,  not  the 
individual’s. This is the sort of fitness one talks about when saying that a particular trait is fitter  
than another. Dawkins does not seem to have any particular misgivings about this usage, other  
than the criticism he levels at the term as a whole.
The  most  common association  to  biological  fitness  is  probably  the  third  usage,  so-called 
classical fitness. Rather than a property of genes, it is a property of individuals, ‘often expressed 
as the product of survival and fecundity’ (Ibid., 183). This, of course, does not sit well with the 
gene selectionist Dawkins, rehearsing his famous argument that individuals do not reproduce. 
The gist of his criticism can be found here, in the tendency of ‘fitness’ to be concerned with  
individuals, rather than with genes. As he explains later, he believes ‘that thinking in terms of  
individuals striving to maximise something has led to outright error, in a way that thinking in 
terms of genes striving to maximise something would not’ (Ibid., 189).
The next two usages are inclusive fitness and personal fitness. I will conflate them here, as 
personal  fitness  is  ‘a  kind of  backwards  way of  looking at  inclusive fitness….  [which]  when 
properly  used,… give[s]  equivalent  results’  (Ibid.,  187).  The difference  is  not  trivial,  but  too 
technical  to  be  of  interest  here.  Both  usages  stem from  a  paper  by  William  D.  Hamilton, 
observing that natural selection will favour not only genes conferring direct reproductive success,  
but also genes enhancing the reproductive success of other individuals carrying them (Hamilton 
1964).  Hamilton’s  paper  provided  a  rigorous  mathematical  confirmation  for  J.B.S  Haldane’s 
famous comment that he would give his life to save two brothers, or eight cousins (McElreath 
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and Boyd 2007, 82), referring to the fact that two brothers or eight cousins would, on average,  
carry equal numbers of duplicates of a given gene (such as a gene for altruism). If, for instance, a  
gene induces its host to sacrifice its life to save four children, then for every one gene copy lost in  
this way, on average two copies would survive (a child has only a 50% chance of having a given 
gene from one parent), and as such, the sacrifice would be evolutionarily profitable. Compelling  
though the idea is, it comes with a trap; while properly conceived as a property of an organism’s  
actions or effort, it was initially ‘extremely common’ to see it as a property of the organism itself  
(Dawkins 1999, 186). This implies the untenable conclusion that ‘the inclusive fitness of a brother 
yet unborn would theoretically be increased by the birth of his elder nephew’ (Ibid.). Hamilton 
himself saw this problem at the onset, and it seems to have all but disappeared from mainstream 
biology these days, but the scholars of the humanities adopting evolutionary approaches should 
take note of the confusion. At any rate, the confusion is avoided by remembering that fitness is a 
property of genes, but not individuals.
Recently, more serious criticism of inclusive fitness has been levelled by Nowak, Tarnita and 
Wilson, claiming it to be ‘an unnecessary detour, which does not provide additional insight or 
information’ (Nowak, Tarnita,  and Wilson 2010) It also seems that ‘members of social  insect 
colonies cannot actually recognise their own degree of relatedness to their nest mates’ (Nowak 
and Highfield 2011, 106), which they claim is a prerequisite for inclusive fitness to work at all. 
However, Nowak et al. find natural selection acting on genes to be quite sufficient for explaining 
what biologists previously thought required inclusive fitness. The findings of Nowak et al. seems 
to be in agreement with Dawkins, who argues that the findings ‘expressed in terms of inclusive 
fitness  [could]  have  been  more  simply  derived  in  terms  of  Hamilton’s  “intelligent  gene,” 
manipulating bodies for its own ends’ (Dawkins 1999, 188). This paper was heavily criticised in 
five letters to Nature, one of which had no less than 137 signatories, claiming that inclusive fitness 
has  produced  extensive  results  (Abbot  et  al.  2011;  Strassmann  et  al.  2011).  Furthermore,  
eusociality  (the  form of  organisation  found  in  social  insects  and  naked  mole  rats)  has  only 
evolved in full-sibling families, strongly indicating that relatedness really matters (Boomsma et al.  
2011).
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Because  of  the  possibility  of  confusing  these  different  forms  of  fitness,  and  the  possible 
confusion with inclusive fitness, Dawkins suggests doing away with the term altogether (Dawkins 
1999, 193). Almost three decades later, however, the term persists, and it seems it is doing good  
service. Both Dawkins’ and Nowak’s critiques against inclusive fitness seem largely unfounded, 
and as  long as  we are  careful  about  what sense  we are  employing when using ‘fitness’  in  a 
technical way, we should probably be in the right doing so.
2.4: Constraints on Optimality
The main contribution of the spandrel debate was, arguably, in bringing more attention to the 
limits of evolution. Still, these constraints were not news to serious students of adaptation, and 
indeed, they represent a highly interesting part of evolutionary theory. A central metaphor for 
explaining adaptation is Sewall Wright’s fitness landscape (Wright 1932), wherein adaptations are 
represented as peaks of high fitness. The horizontal distances represent genetic difference, so that  
the distance between two points in the landscape corresponds to the number of mutations it  
takes to get from one trait to another. The underlying assumption is that natural selection only  
allows populations to climb in this landscape, that is, evolve adaptations. In this way, evolution 
can be constrained by lack of viable options:  In other words,  natural selection cannot lead a  
population to be less adapted. Thus, populations at one adaptive peak may not reach a higher 
summit, because getting there would require descending into the adaptive valley in between. This 
is one of the many reasons no animal has evolved wheels—for legs to gradually evolve into wheels 
over generations requires  intermediary variants  that  are hybrids  of  legs  and wheels,  with no 
conceivable selective advantage.
Other constraints abound, as well. My presentation here will be largely based on Dawkins’ list 
of six constraints (Dawkins 1999, ch. 3). They are: (1) time lags, (2) historical constraints, (3) 
available genetic variation, (4) constraints of costs and materials, (5) imperfections at one level  
due  to  selection at  another  level,  and (6)  mistakes  due  to  environmental  unpredictability  or 
‘malevolence.’ The fifth of these were given separate treatment in the above section on multilevel 
selection, the rest will be discussed below, along with (7) developmental constraints, which is 
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missing from Dawkins’ list, although it can be seen as an elaboration on (3) (Amundson 1994). 
We should also note that even though Dawkins is writing about constraints on genetic evolution, 
most,  or  even all  of  these,  are  with some modification applicable  to cultural  evolution.  For 
example, substitute ‘cultural’ for ‘genetic’ in constraint (3).
The first constraint is especially relevant to studies of human culture, evolving as it does at a  
rate with which biological  evolution can only dream to keep up.  Time lags occur when the 
environment changes, so that previous adaptations are no longer helpful, and the organisms in 
question have not yet had time to readapt. Dawkins cites the example of the moth and the candle  
flame: For most of their evolutionary history, small sources of light in darkness would have been 
either small openings to escape through, or celestial bodies to manoeuvre after. The result is 
glaringly  obvious  if  the  moth  assumes  a  candle  to  be  an  opening  to  fly  through.  A bit  of 
geometry also shows that trying to keep a nearby flame at a constant angle results not in the  
straight flight we would have seen, had the candle been a distant star, but rather, the familiar 
spiralling towards immolation and a clear display of maladaptation (Ibid., 37).
While moths are maladapted to the occasional candle flame, we humans surround ourselves 
with cultures  that  can seem almost  entirely novel,  evolutionarily speaking.  In a  mere 10,000  
years,  or  400–500  generations,  we have  gone  from hunter-gatherers  to  stock-market  analysts. 
Modern lifestyles are  radically different from those to which we have adapted (Freeman and 
Herron  2007,  ch.  14.5).  This  is  an  important  consideration  when  asking  whether  certain 
behaviours  are  adaptive.  Dawkins,  on  the  adaptedness  of  contraceptives,  claims  that  ‘the 
question, about the adaptive significance of behaviour in an artificial world, should never have 
been put’ (Dawkins 1999, 36). He seems to be overreacting a bit, but there is a universal lesson 
here: take care to ask the right questions. Rather than asking if contraceptives are adaptive, we  
can  ask  what  their  adaptive  basis  might  be.  What  traits  do  we  possess  that  in  modern 
environments manifest itself as a preference for contraceptives?
Both historical constraints and available genetic variation can be explained with reference to 
the  above-mentioned  fitness  landscape.  Historical  constraints  would  be  represented  as  a  
population’s current position, and available genetic variation would be the ability to traverse 
certain paths.  It  should  be  obvious  why the  latter  is  a  constraint:  if  genetic  variation  for  a 
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particular  trait  does  not  exist,  then  that  trait’s  location  in  the  fitness  landscape  will  be  
inaccessible, and the trait cannot evolve. Historical constraints are a bit less intuitive, and requires  
a more thorough presentation of the idea of a fitness landscape.
A fitness landscape is typically visualised as a three-dimensional landscape, where elevation 
represents differences in fitness,4 and horizontal movement represents differences in genotype or 
phenotype,  depending  on  what  is  of  interest  to  the  present  study.  A  more  correct  fitness  
landscape  would  have  as  many dimensions  as  the  organism in  question  had  genes,  plus  the 
standard  ‘height’  dimension  for  fitness.  This,  of  course,  is  entirely  unfeasible,  as  well  as 
unnecessary, with three dimensions being quite sufficient to get the point across.
As mentioned at the outset, the central assumption is that evolving organisms only will be  
able to rise in this landscape, because descending would mean selecting for less fit traits, which  
would imply a reversal of natural selection. As so often in science, assumptions of this kind prove 
upon closer inspection to be oversimplifications. Indeed there are mechanisms to cross adaptive 
valleys, two of the most prominent being drift and changes to the landscape itself. The latter was 
implied when we discussed time lags—if  new circumstances  change the fitness  of  traits,  new 
opportunities for evolution present themselves. Lactose tolerance in adults, for example, could 
never have evolved in an environment without dairy farming, as the enzyme lactase would just be 
a waste of resources. Incidentally, lactose tolerance, needing only a single mutation, is one of the 
few clear examples of humans catching up with the time lag since making the shift from hunter-
gatherers. People from areas of the globe without long traditions for dairy farming, however, are 
living examples of time lag, unable to metabolise lactose (Feldman and Laland 1996). There is also 
another way for the fitness  landscape to change—if  variation for a trait  increases,  the fitness 
landscape  will  be  smoothed out  ‘because  the  population’s  mean fitness  is  determined  by an 
average taken over a broader distribution of phenotypes’ (M. Kirkpatrick 1996, 139).
The other important mechanism for crossing adaptive valleys is genetic drift (or just drift, to 
allow for other forms of evolution). Genetic drift is random changes in gene frequencies due to 
sampling error (Freeman and Herron 2007, 234). Though random, drift can be significant, as 
4  Although the term ‘fitness’ was problematised in the previous section, it is used here in a non-technical sense. It 
does not matter how we measure fitness in this regard—the point is that some genotypes are fitter than others, and 
this restricts evolution as described above.
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with the founder effect, which occurs when a small group settle in a novel habitat (Ibid., 236–
238). As a small group, they will represent a biased sample of their group of origin, and so gene 
frequencies in the new group will be skewed. Unless maladaptive, traits that were rare in the 
original  group can become fixed in the  new group.  In other  situations,  however,  drift  is  of  
limited  influence,  and  even  for  small  groups  to  cross  modest  adaptive  valleys  can  take  an 
astounding number of generations (M. Kirkpatrick 1996, 137).
For examples of these two constraints, i.e. historical constraints and lack of genetic variation, 
we can return again to sex ratios. As mentioned above, the evolutionary stable ratio between 
sexes is unity, but there are exceptions to this. When the two sexes require different levels of 
parental  investment,  selection  can  indeed  produce  other  ratios  (Trivers  and  Willard  1973).  
However,  the  data  shows  that  this  is  much  more  common  in  haplodiploid  species,  where 
fertilised eggs develop as female, and unfertilised eggs as male. It turns out that chromosomal sex 
determination, where all eggs are fertilised, is more costly to control, and thus requires a greater  
benefit to evolve (West and Sheldon 2002). Here, chromosomal sex determination is a historical 
constraint on sex ratio adjustment, reducing the chance that the latter will evolve—the ability to 
control sex ratios is partially dependent on the already evolved mechanism of sex determination.  
An example of selection constrained by available genetic variation is found in dairy cattle sex 
ratios.  Cattle  breeders  would  greatly  value  a  bias  towards  female  offspring,  bulls  being 
notoriously bad at producing milk. However, there seem to be no available genetic variation for 
sex ratio adjustment in cattle, which constrains artificial selection on this (Dawkins 1999, 43).
Next up are constraints of costs and materials. These are simply cost-benefit calculations, and 
the main point is that traits that would seem to be obvious improvements will not evolve unless  
the benefits outweigh the costs. In Dawkins’ words, ‘any design that achieves “better” than the 
specified criterion performance is likely to be rejected, because presumably the criterion could be 
achieved more cheaply’ (Ibid., 46). Outrunning your predators with a large margin is obviously 
‘better’ than just outrunning them, but selection is unlikely to produce much above the bare  
minimum for survival and reproduction. This is the reason our big brains present us with such a 
conundrum—they obviously evolved for a purpose, but what necessitated brains so hugely out of 
proportion with our body size? Bigger brain are obviously ‘better’ from at least one perspective, 
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but  selection  will  generally  not  produce  anything  exceeding  the  demands  posed  by  the 
environment. In a way, this is not a real constraint, as it is not a mechanism by which organisms 
perform suboptimally, but rather one by which they avoid ostensibly good solutions because 
they would not be worthwhile. Dawkins cites an interesting study where digger wasps (Sphex  
ichneumoneus) seemed to commit the so-called Concorde fallacy, by valuing a resource according 
to prior investments, rather than actual profitability (Dawkins and Brockmann 1980). It turned 
out that the wasps’ choices were the best ones they could make, given the available information.  
A better  assessment  of  the  situation  could  lead  to  better  strategies,  but  at  too  a  high  cost.  
Dawkins comments that the discovery was made by post hoc modification to suit the hypothesis 
of optimization, but in defence quotes Maynard Smith, writing that ‘in testing a model we are  
not  testing  the  general  proposition  that  nature  optimises,  but  the  specific  hypotheses  about 
constraints,  optimization  criteria,  and  heredity’  (Maynard  Smith  1978,  43).  Note  that  this 
argument is in agreement with the defence against ‘Spandrels’ that adaptationism is a research 
program, not a hypothesis.
Then  there  are  mistakes  due  to  environmental  unpredictability  or  ‘malevolence.’  This  is 
simply a constraint of complexity—evolution prepares organisms for statistically likely scenarios, 
but cannot foresee every minute detail. This is mainly a problem when it comes to behaviours, as 
the short  time spans to which behaviours  relate are  especially susceptible  to unpredictability 
(Dawkins 1999, 53). Malevolence, in this regard, pertains to directly competing organisms, to 
which the unlucky subject organism has not had occasion to adapt.
Finally, there are the developmental constraints. This sort of constraint is perhaps the one  
closest  to  Gould  and  Lewontin’s  spandrels.  They  are  biases  ‘on  the  production  of  variant 
phenotypes  or  a  limitation  on  phenotypic  variability  caused  by  the  structure,  character, 
composition, or dynamics of the developmental system’ (Maynard Smith et al. 1985). In other 
words, a constraint on available variation due to how traits are produced. According to Gilbert,  
developmental  constraints  can be further  divided into physical,  morphogenetic,  and phyletic 
constraints (Gilbert 2006, 744). However, phyletic constraints are really the same as historical  
constraints,  yet  Gould  and Lewontin see  it  the  other  way around;  for  them,  developmental 
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constraints are a subgroup of phyletic constraints (Gould and Lewontin 1979, 594). Whatever the 
ordering, the important point is the different ways in which adaptation can be constrained.
Physical constraints are quite simply limitations imposed on evolution by physics. Here, we 
see another reason animals do not come with wheels: physics will not allow blood to circulate to 
a rotating organ (Gilbert 2006, 744). Morphogenesis is the process of organisms developing their 
shape,  and  this  can  be  constrained  in  a  number  of  ways.  Constraints  can  define  the  initial 
parameters of a trait, its development, or how and when this development ends (Bard 1990, 251).  
An example is  found in some freshwater turtles  (Chrysemys  picta and  Deirochelys  reticularia), 
unable to produce eggs large enough to achieve the optimal balance between egg size and number 
of eggs produced (Congdon and Gibbons 1987).
This presentation of constraints is far from exhaustive. There are also a number of constraints  
arising from the mechanisms of Mendelian genetics, but these are probably too technical to be of 
interest here. They include pleiotropy, where a single gene codes for multiple phenotypic traits 
(Freeman and Herron 2007, 496), overdominance and heterozygote inferiority (Sober 2000, 125–
130).  Overdominance means that fittest  gene combination for a given trait  is  a heterozygote, 
meaning that it consists of two different alleles. In such a case, the optimum cannot ‘breed true,’  
because two heterozygotes might well have homozygote offspring, with equal copies of the allele 
in  question.  With  heterozygote  inferiority,  the  population  will  evolve  towards  one  of  the 
homozygotes, but not necessarily the fittest one—that depends on which one is most common to 
begin with.
2.5: Selecting for Inferiority
There are also other ways that selection itself can produce suboptimal results. Most notably, these  
are arms races, evolutionarily stable strategies, and runaway selection. These are not generally 
seen to be constraining evolution in the same way as the mechanisms described above, but they 
are connected in that they produce costly traits, ones that would not evolve if evolution was 
prescient  or  maximally  cooperative.  Furthermore,  traits  can  be  maladaptive  for  the  host 
organism if they are produced by another organism, such as a parasite. The different themes 
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mentioned here have some overlap; exploitation of one organism by another, for instance, will  
typically  lead  to  an  arms  race  between  the  two.  I  will  endeavour  to  show  later  (4.2)  that 
mechanisms such as these threaten the cooperation that hard-to-fake signalling is supposed to 
establish.
Runaway selection and evolutionarily stable strategies should have been amply treated in the 
introductory chapter,  under mechanisms of selection,  but it  is  worth reiterating. In runaway 
selection, the feedback dynamic inherent in genetic correlations between a particular signal and 
mating preference for that same signal may evolve both these well beyond the optimum from a 
survival perspective. To return to the peacock’s tail, having the longest tail of the population 
would confer the same fitness benefit before the evolution of splendid tails took off, at a lower 
cost, since a shorter tail would be less of a handicap. The importance of handicap signals is not  
absolute handicap, but rather relative handicap. The problem arises when peacocks are selected 
for the longest tail for successive generations: The benefit of having a relatively long tail stays the 
same,  while  in  absolute  terms,  tail  length  becomes  an  increasing  liability.  However,  if 
survivability is significantly reduced, and not offset by increased reproduction, selection should 
favour less ornamental tails (Feldhamer 2007, 423). Overall, though, the process is evidently a 
costly one.
The problem with evolutionarily stable  strategies  is  that  they are  typically a  compromise 
between  optimal,  cooperative  solutions,  and  the  need  to  defend  against  exploitation.  If  a 
population consisted entirely of cooperators, every one of them would likely stand to benefit  
from synergy. However, in response to invasion by non-cooperating organisms, indiscriminate 
cooperation will be selected against. For example, if all trees could restrict their growth to a set  
limit, they could all grow to that height and get equal amounts of sunlight, without spending too 
much resources on growth. However, since such a strategy would be susceptible to trees cheating 
by growing ever  so slightly more to gain a  little  more sunlight,  trees  grow to preposterous,  
wasteful heights to outcompete each other (Vincent and Brown 2005, 95–96). The theoretically 
optimal  strategy  of  not  wasting  energy  on  an  unproductive  trunk  thus  loses  out  to  the 
evolutionarily stable strategy of growing ever taller.
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This last example could serve just as well for arms races, but a more specific example will  
illustrate how peculiar effects selection can produce. Locusts of the genus Magicicada have a very 
distinct life  cycle—they live as underground nymphs for either 13 or 17 years,  depending on 
species, before emerging for but a few weeks to reproduce (M. Lloyd and Dybas 1966). In a given 
location, all but a negligible few cicadas are exactly the same age, so that for most of the time, the  
area appears entirely locust-free. While severely limiting reproductive capacity in this way might  
not seem like much of an adaptation, it turns out to have a very definite advantage: The more 
time these periodical cicadas spend as underground nymphs, the less basis there are for specialised 
above-ground parasites to thrive on them. Lloyd and Dybas hypothesised that the cicadas had 
evolved longer and longer cycles in a race against some parasite that eventually could not keep up, 
and went extinct (Ibid., 479). Predators with shorter, overlapping cycles are avoided by the cycles 
being of a prime number of years (Ibid., 482).
Arms races can also be found in the case of extended phenotypes,  which are traits in the  
external environment to the individual. Phenotypes in general are observable traits, in contrast to 
genotypes, the genetic constitution of organisms. An organism’s phenotype depends both on its 
genotype and the environment, and it has been one of Dawkins’ major contributions to point 
out the degree in which other organisms are part of that environment, and conversely, that the 
effects of a given gene stretch well beyond that gene’s host organism (Dawkins 1999). The classic  
examples of this are beaver dams, manipulating the terrain well beyond the beaver cells, where  
the  genes  that  control  for  dam-building  sit  (Ibid.,  59).  The  element  of  arms  races  becomes 
apparent  when  one  organism  influences  features  of  another.  Dawkins  cites  reports  of 
correspondence between thicker snail shells and parasite infestations (Cheng 1986), claiming that 
ability to manipulate shell thickness may well be an adaptation on the parasite’s part (Dawkins  
1999, 210). If this is true, it leads to a conflict of interest: For the snail, shell thickness is likely to 
be a trade-off between thick, protective shells, and thinner shells, which could, conceivably,  free 
up resources  to be invested in reproduction.   For the parasite  (a  fluke),  however,  the snail’s  
reproductive success does not matter; rather, the parasite is dependent on a safe environment. 
Dawkins’ case is hypothetical, and it does not really matter exactly what the requirements of the 
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snail and fluke are, respectively—what is important is that the optimum shell thickness is hardly 
likely to be the exact same from both points  of view. As long as that is  true,  there will  be 
selection pressure on both snails  and flukes on ability to reach optimum shell  thickness.  An 
interesting consequence of this, Dawkins notes, is that the flukes in this way will affect shell 
thickness  even  in  unparasitised  snails—if  flukes  are  sufficiently  common  that  snails  are 
compensating by making thinner shells, unparasitised snails will have shell thicknesses below the 
optimum (Dawkins 1999, 212).
Examples such as these show that suboptimality does not necessarily imply that adaptation has 
been constrained. Rather, it can be the case that adaptation itself is the constraining factor, in that 
resources are wasted on competition because cooperation is hampered by opportunism. Or it  
could mean that the adaptation is not where we expect it to be, and that another organism has 
succeeded in manipulating the trait we are examining to its own benefit. Conversely, knowing 
that these mechanisms are powerful in certain situations, we should be alert when they seem not 
to work as expected.
2.6: Summary
Having examined spandrels, multilevel selection, and constraints on optimality, a pattern should 
be evident. Evolution can be seen as a competition between different evolutionary units, and the 
competitive element is pervasive. So pervasive, in fact, that nearly all disagreements concerning  
evolution are to do with the relative importance of mechanisms. As West and Sheldon point out,  
‘More  generally,  understanding  the  relative  importance  of  different  potential  constraints  on 
adaptation remains one of the biggest problems for evolutionary biology’ (West and Sheldon 
2002, 44). ‘Spandrels’ were indeed criticised for several concrete errors and on rhetorical grounds, 
but the debate concerning the main notion has been confined to how pervasive by-products are, 
or how limiting constraints are. No one disagrees that there are constraints on optimality; some 
just assume that selection is such a powerful force that other factors can be ignored. The same 
goes for multilevel selection—opponents do not question the principle, only the assumption that 
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selection  at  any  other  level  than  the  gene  can  be  a  strong  enough  force  to  override  their  
preferences.
Where does this leave us regarding the evolutionary science of religion? We have seen that by-
product  theories  are  viable,  but  require  just  as  much  empirical  support,  if  not  more,  as 
adaptationist theories. We should also be open to the idea of group selection, or indeed selection 
of any kind, possibly in conflict with standard natural selection operating at genes. We turn now 
to the evolutionary approaches to religion, to examine problems of adaptation there.

III  
ADAPTATION IN THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION
hile multi-disciplinary approaches to any science are much appreciated and 
needed, it is a venture best undertaken with great care. As shown in the 
previous  chapter,  the  biological  concept  of  adaptation  is  fraught  with 
complications, most of which have gone largely unnoticed in the evolutionary science of 
religion.  Nonetheless,  adaptation  is  arguably  the  central  distinction  between  different 
evolutionary theories of religion—on the one hand, there are those who argue that religion 
is  an adaptation,  and on the  other,  those  who argue  that  it  is  a  by-product.  What  an 
adaptation  is,  is  more  or  less  taken for  granted,  and the  discussion  seems not  to  have 
incorporated the theoretical advances made in biology.
W
In this chapter, I will present the discussion on adaptation as far as religion is concerned. 
I open with a section on the issue of how religion is to be defined, that old chestnut of 
studying religion. I argue that the matter is especially pertinent for evolutionary approaches 
to religion, and that it is time to embrace family resemblance definitions. Second, I examine 
the chief argument for religion as an adaptation, namely the theory of hard-to-fake signals  
of  group commitment.  This  is  a  theory with easily missed caveats,  and I  present  some 
mechanisms that might make it work. Third are by-product theories of religion, where I 
will  investigate  concepts  such  as  hyperactive  agency  detection  and  minimally  counter-
intuitive concepts. Fourth, the arguably underestimated approach of seeing religion as an 
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evolvable  entity  in  its  own  right  is  presented.  I  will  argue  that  the  question  of  religion’s 
adaptedness probably is best answered by employing a mix of the three viewpoints, and that they 
are not at all as incompatible as they may perhaps at first appear.
3.1: Defining Religion
The  question  of  how to  define  religion  is  as  old  as  the  science  of  religion  itself,  and  still  
undecided. Sociologist of religion James A. Beckford even claims that ‘an all-purpose, universally 
acceptable definition of religion is unattainable’ (Beckford 2003, 20) This is no small matter—
Russell McCutcheon calls definitions ‘theories in miniature’ (McCutcheon 2001, 13), so that not 
having a  definition is  not  far  shy of  not having a  theory.  In an evolutionary framework,  a  
definition arguably becomes more important still, as the question of whether religion is adaptive 
cannot very well be settled unless one knows what religion is. Or at least what one assumes it to 
be—as anthropologist  Marvin Harris  once suggested,  ‘[r]ather than employ concepts  that  are 
necessarily real, meaningful, and appropriate from the native point of view, the observer is free to 
use alien categories and rules derived from the data language of science’ (M. Harris 1979, 32). 
With religion being notoriously difficult to define, this is valuable advice. If redescribing religion 
in this way sounds too drastic, Benson Saler offers an alternative: Perhaps it is time to revive 
Wittgenstein’s old concept of family resemblance (Wittgenstein 1953, §66–71), and see religion as  
related ‘by similarities that differentially overlap and criss-cross, not by sharing some essence’ 
(Saler 2008, 222). His suggestion should have appeal to proponents of evolutionary approaches, as 
gradual evolution means that things are related by degree, rather than separated by essence, the 
latter word being frowned upon by evolutionary scientists (Dennett 1995, 36–39). Saler quotes 
biologist and evolutionary theorist Ernst Mayr as saying that ‘Darwin showed that one simply 
could not understand evolution as long as one accepted essentialism’ (Mayr 2001, 83), arguing 
that the same is likely to be true for religion (Saler 2008, 224).
Turning first to current definitions in the Cognitive Science of Religion, we seem to be back 
where we started. Tylor famously defined religion as ‘the belief in spiritual beings’ (Tylor 1871,  
I:383),  a  modern version  of  which  could  be  Guthrie’s  ‘systematic  application  of  human-like 
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models  to  non-human,  in  addition  to  human,  phenomena’  (Guthrie  1980,  181).  E.  Thomas 
Lawson and Robert N. McCauley are also close, seeing a ‘religious system as a symbolic-cultural  
system of ritual acts accompanied by an extensive and largely shared conceptual scheme that  
includes culturally postulated superhuman agents’ (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 5), and Harvey 
Whitehouse even accepts Tylor’s definition outright (Whitehouse and Martin 2004, 230). But 
other than this, definitions of religion are curiously absent from most of the major works in the  
Cognitive Science of Religion. Lee A. Kirkpatrick plainly refuses to define it, claiming that he 
means  ‘pretty  much what  most  people  mean  by  the  term’  (L.  Kirkpatrick  2005,  15).  Ilkka 
Pyysiäinen  does  not  see  the  point  in  defining  religion,  because  definitions  ‘only  reduce  the 
defined  concepts  to  undefined  ones  without  that  much  benefit  from  the  point  of  view  of 
empirical  study (sic)’  (Pyysiäinen 2004,  54).  Boyer,  in  The  Naturalness  of  Religious  Ideas,  sees 
definitions  as  ‘the  outcome,  rather  than  the  starting  point,  of  particular  research  programs’ 
(Boyer 1994, 33), and also denies giving a precise definition—in Religion Explained, he ignores the 
question altogether. Justin L. Barrett does not define religion in his book  Why Would Anyone  
Believe in God?, but he does define gods as ‘broadly any number of superhuman beings in whose  
existence at least a single group of people believe and who behave on the basis of these beliefs’ 
(Barrett 2004, 21). D. Jason Slone, not about to uproot received wisdom, concedes that ‘religion 
is centrally about dealings with postulated superhuman agents’ (Slone 2004, 5), but makes a much 
more interesting suggestion in saying that perhaps religions ought to be ‘construed prototypically 
rather than classically’ (Ibid., 71).
A prototypical definition posits a standard with which other entities can be loosely compared,  
rather than listing a set of necessary condition, all of which a definiendum must meet to qualify. 
The qualities of such an prototype can be seen as a set of family resemblances, so that the more of  
those  resemblances  the  case  shares  with  the  prototype,  the  better  it  fits  the  definition.  For 
example, orthodox  Theravāda  Buddhism would be a very good fit with most prototypical, or 
family resemblance, definitions of religion, except of course that it lacks worship of gods. 1 When 
employing  a  prototypical  definition,  one  might  for  example  decide  that  subjects  would  be 
1 That some Theravādins no doubt worship gods is beside the point, which is that some demonstrably don’t, and 
still are seen by most researchers as interesting subjects for a science of religion.
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weighed according to their fit with the prototype, or to split analysis in parts, so that each trait  
making up the prototype would be considered by itself (Martin 2008, 351; Bering 2005).
The example of Theravāda Buddhism is but one of the many familiar examples demonstrating 
that religion is an ambiguous category that does not lend itself to precise, yet all-encompassing 
definitions. Saler argues that religion is not even a specific thing, but rather ‘variable congeries of 
different elements …. [that] did not all evolve together; rather, they arose as spandrels in the 
evolution of certain capacities and dispositions that offered adaptive advantages’ (Saler 2008, 215–
216) The assumption of spandrelism may well be premature, and we should stay open to the 
possibility that religion might be a conglomerate of spandrels  and  adaptations, but the quote 
hints that family resemblance definitions are well suited for religion in general, and the question 
of adaptation in particular. And in fact, the few cognitive scientists of religion who don’t settle  
for one-sided superhuman definitions or overlook the question altogether seem rather open to 
the concept of family resemblance (below, see also: S. Atran and Norenzayan 2004; Alcorta and 
Sosis 2005; Bulbulia 2005; Whitehouse 2008). This approach could even explain the reluctance of  
some scholars to define religion, for as Barrett writes, 
Rather than specify what religion is and try to explain it in whole, scholars in this field have generally chosen to  
approach ‘religion’ in an incremental, piecemeal fashion, identifying human thought or behavioral patterns that 
might count as ‘religious’ and then trying to explain why those patterns are cross-culturally recurrent. If the 
explanations  turn out to be  part  of  a  grander  explanation of ‘religion’,  so be  it.  If  not,  meaningful  human 
phenomena have still been rigorously addressed. (Barrett 2007, 768)
Tom Sjöblom follows anthropologist Donald Brown (1991, 48) in calling religion a ‘universal of 
classification’ as opposed to an ‘universal of content,’ writing that these universal of classification 
‘share common patterns but not necessarily individual components’ (Sjöblom 2007, 293), which 
arguably seems like family resemblance. Sperber is explicitly supportive of family resemblance, 
although ‘a different kind of family resemblance from the one Wittgenstein and Needham (1975) 
had in mind’ (Sperber 1996, 17). He writes that ‘the resemblance involved is a resemblance in 
meaning among all  the  notions  rendered by means  of  the  terms,  rather  than a  resemblance 
among the things referred to by these terms’—an ‘interpretative resemblance’ (Ibid.) Sperber’s  
distinction may be well worth mentioning, but for the present discussion, the most important 
point is that he is one of many advocates of family resemblance definitions.
Adaptation in the Science of Religion - 3.1: Defining Religion 39
There is good reason for cognitive scientists of religion to be more open to family resemblance 
definitions than other scholars of religion. Both groups have the problem of religion being a 
fuzzy category, but in light of adaptation, there is yet another issue. Even if a particular species of 
animal is well defined, separated from its closest relatives by too many generations for any doubts 
about delimitation, one cannot well ask if that species is an adaptation. Religion is not only a 
fuzzy category, it is also an immensely complex one. And the question of adaptation should be 
asked on a trait basis, not for a whole collection of traits, like religion. We should not expect to  
discover  whether  religion  is  an  adaptation,  but  whether  it  is  composed  of  traits  which  are  
themselves adaptations, by-products, or a mix of the two. While this could well amount to a  
definition of several necessary traits found in all religions, I think the open-ended approach of  
family resemblance is better suited still. Family resemblance definitions of religion helpfully shift  
the imagination away from religions as entities with essences that can be adaptive or not, over to  
a loose conglomeration of different traits, some of which may be adaptations, some of which 
may serve largely different purposes but be exploited for religious purposes, and some of which 
may be cultural, and have an evolutionary trajectory quite apart from our DNA. In other words,  
endorsing a family resemblance definition is an admission that the subject demands a pragmatic  
approach, an admission I am entirely comfortable with.
3.2: Religion as an Adaptation
The debate  on whether or  not religion is  an adaptation is  fundamentally  similar  to the old  
question of functionalism, which has been with scholars of religion at least since Durkheim’s day. 
An interesting difference, perhaps, is that while functionalists have been thought by many to 
reduce religion to a mere profane matter, their modern counterparts, the adaptationists, now 
form religion’s defence against those critics of religion who see it as a by-product. They claim 
that religious people live longer, healthier lives, are better socialised, but most importantly, that 
religion solves the so-called free rider problem. This is what occurs when society as a whole is  
better off if everyone cooperates, but individuals who cheat, are even better off. Adaptationists 
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usually argue that religion inhibits cheating by making group participation so costly that would-
be cheaters are deterred.
We will first examine the adaptationist side of the argument, which in fact is an elaborate  
version of the handicap principle. This is the principle that explains the magnificent peacock’s  
tail  as  a  deliberate  handicap to  demonstrate  quality  to  potential  mates,  because  only a  high 
quality peacock would be able to avoid predation in spite of such a tail (Zahavi 1975). Hence, the  
disadvantage to survival  is  offset by signalling that  the peacock is  still  very fit,  and hence a  
suitable partner. Probably the most common argument for religion as an adaptation is William 
Irons’ theory about hard-to-fake signs of commitment (Irons 1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 2001), which 
has been elaborated upon by several scholars (e.g., Berman 2000; Cronk 1994; Iannaccone 1992; 
1994; Sosis 2003; Sosis and Ruffle 2003; Sosis and Bressler 2003). It progresses among much the 
same lines as the standard handicap argument, and sees rituals as costly endeavours, which only 
confer individual fitness advantages through signalling commitment. The adaptive problem that a 
signal of commitment is most commonly supposed to solve can be analysed in the prisoner’s 
dilemma. Arguably the most famous implementation of game theory,  this dilemma presents two 
prisoners  who are  given the choice  of  testifying against  the  other  for  a  reduced penalty,  or  
remaining silent. If both remain silent (mutual cooperation) they will receive a relatively mild  
sentence because there is not enough evidence for a full conviction. This outcome is called R for 
Reward for mutual cooperation, and is the best outcome when averaged for both prisoners. For 
an individual prisoner, however, there is an even better outcome: T, or Temptation to defect. 
Here, the defecting prisoner testifies against the other, and gets the mildest possible sentence,  
while the cooperating prisoner gets the hardest possible sentence, the Sucker’s payoff, or S. The 
last  outcome is  P,  Punishment  for  mutual  defection,  where both prisoners  defect,  and get  a 
relatively hard sentence, but with some reward for testifying. For a true prisoner’s dilemma, the  
sentences must be set so that T > R > P > S, and for repeated prisoner’s dilemma, 2R > T+S  
(Hofstadter 1983). This is to ensure that the optimal averaged outcome is mutual cooperation, 
although there is a temptation for an even higher reward for lone defectors.
This  dilemma  is  related  to  the  aptly-named  tragedy  of  the  commons  (Hardin  1968).  If 
cooperation could be ensured, long-term optimality would ensue, but evolution being a myopic 
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process, defecting opportunists abound. A population of co-operators would have a high fitness, 
but would be susceptible to invasion by a defecting mutant, who would have an even higher 
fitness  until  his  descendants  would  dominate  the  population  so  there  would  be  too few co-
operators left to free-ride on. An adaptation securing cooperation against this predicament, it  
seems, would be most welcome. 
Alternatively, the problem of cooperation can be interpreted as a stag hunt (Bulbulia 2009a;  
Bulbulia  and  Frean  2009), after  the  thought  experiment  proposed  by  Rousseau  (1755).  He 
proposed that hunters could choose to hunt for either stag or hares. Stag hunting would benefit  
everyone the most, but only on the condition that everyone cooperated, because stag are difficult 
game to hunt. If a hunter suspects that any other hunter is unwilling to cooperate, he has the 
option of hunting hare. In this case, he will reap a lesser bounty, but one that is not dependent 
on his  hunting party.  This  scenario  is  fundamentally  different  from the prisoner’s  dilemma, 
because here, there is no longer any incentive to cheat. Rather, the threat to cooperation is the 
fear of any other member defecting, which of course will grow the larger the group becomes.  
Modelling  religious  cooperation on the  stag hunt,  rather  than the prisoner’s  dilemma, is  an 
interesting  endeavour  with  potentially  far-reaching  implications,  but  that  presupposes  that 
cooperative problems for which religion is a candidate to solve, in fact does resemble a stag hunt. 
For the present thesis, I will concentrate on the prisoner’s dilemma, as it seems to be the most 
common model  of  cooperative  problems in adaptive  theories  of  religion.  And if  religion or 
religiousness is a solution to the prisoner’s dilemma, then the problem is one of cheating.
This  is  where signals  of  commitment come in.  An act  of  cooperation in itself  is,  by the 
prisoner’s dilemma, detrimental to the fitness of the performer, and as such dependent on the 
favour being returned. It is in the cooperators’ interest to form groups with other co-operators, 
but  how can  they  ensure  that  other  group  members  are  not  defecting  invaders?  The  main 
adaptive theory of religion suggests that observing costly, hard-to-fake rituals serve as signs of  
being committed to the group. If they are taken as a requisite for receiving cooperation, it is  
supposed that free riders will be deterred by the high cost of entering the group, and only true 
cooperators will remain.
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However, this is clearly insufficient. Handicaps work because they demonstrate a surplus of 
the resource or trait  that is being sought after. When a peacock grows a splendid tail, or a deer 
grows great antlers, they are able to do this because they have energy left after living expenses 
have been paid. If the tail or antlers are symmetrical and spotless, this is an indication that the  
owner is disease-free, because many diseases would have interfered with this. But when Haredi 
Jews spend most of the day in prayer, dressed in clothing hardly suitable for a Middle Eastern 
climate, they demonstrate a number of traits, from persistence to compliance, but not necessarily 
commitment to cooperation.  There seem to be nothing stopping a would-be free rider from 
paying lip service to the rituals, while still avoiding the cost of cooperation.
Richard Sosis suggests that what makes this signalling of commitment work is a combination 
of differing perceptions of costs and the psychological effects of performing rituals (Sosis 2003).  
He claims that  believers  will  perceive costs  of  ritual  as  less  than would non-believers,  while 
simultaneously exaggerating the benefits. Furthermore, merely taking part in ritual stimulates 
belief. In this way, religious groups tend to be dominated by believers rather than free riders, and  
these can then more or less embrace an entire set of values, which include cooperation. Sosis  
mentions two theories that might explain how belief is formed when performing rituals: self-
perception theory (Bem 1972) and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957; 1964). The former 
claims that people can acquire attitudes and beliefs by observing themselves, and the latter claims 
that the discomfort of a conflict between attitudes and actions may lead to a change of attitudes.  
As Sosis notes, the argument does not depend on which one of these is correct, so long as studies 
demonstrate that beliefs are in fact affected by actions. He gives several arguments and examples 
that this is in fact so (Sosis 2003, 98–100), one of the most telling being the Unification Church’s 
attraction of members  through involving them in a number of activities for months on end 
before even introducing them to the teachings of the Rev. Sun Myung Moon (Pesternak 1988). If 
these assumptions are correct, and participation in ritual catalyses belief in group values, so that  
religious displays act as  reliable  markers  for willingness  to cooperate,  then this  again can be  
strengthened through group selection. Richerson and Boyd argue that when ‘reliable symbolic 
markers exist, selection will favor the psychological propensity to imitate and interact selectively 
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with individuals who share the same symbolic markers’ (Richerson and Boyd 2005, 212). This, in 
turn,  strengthens  the  group  as  unit  of  selection  by  reducing  within-group  variation  while 
reinforcing differences between groups. If then also ‘cultural rules arise that cause individuals to 
sacrifice their own interests for the good of the group, group selection can cause the frequency of 
individually costly but group-beneficial traits to increase’ (Ibid., 162). In the case of hard-to-fake 
signalling, the demand of such cultural rules is obviously already met.
Richerson and Boyd are  writing about culture in general,  but  on this  topic,  their  theory 
converges with Sosis’, and the two theories reinforce each other. Hard-to-fake signalling can arise  
because it is a reliable signal of willingness to cooperate, and thus, those who exhibit such signals,  
i.e. religiousness, will increase their own fitness as they become beneficiaries of the cooperative 
efforts  of  their  co-religionists.  As  all  this  signalling  creates  well-demarcated  groups,  group 
selection begins to act, further increasing the opportunity for cooperation.
But, as group cooperation grows stronger, so does the incentive to cheat. One solution to the  
problem of cheating is punishment, to remove the cheaters’ benefit. However, punishing cheaters 
entail opportunity costs, and punishers thus face the so-called second-order free-rider problem 
(Guttman 1978; Yamagishi 1986; Heckathorn 1989). This is the same problem as the regular, first-
order  free-rider  problem,  only that  now, the public  good that  cheaters  will  avoid paying to 
provide is  punishment.  The solution that religion is  proposed to contribute,  is  the threat of 
supernatural punishment (Bering and Johnson 2005; Schloss and Murray 2011). Thus, religious 
belief  not  only explains  what  motivates  cooperation in the  first  place,  but  also  why people 
abstain  from  cheating  when  widespread  cooperation  would  seem  to  make  such  cheating 
profitable. It is as if punishment has been outsourced to gods. Of course, this means that cheating  
really is no more costly than it would be without the threat of punishment, it only appears as if  
it is to would-be cheaters.
In contexts where people cannot rely on supernatural punishment of cheaters, we can expect 
them to be as averse to people who do not punish cheaters as they are to cheaters themselves.  
This is because the existence of nonpunitive ‘suckers’ is a threat to cooperation, as ‘they make 
cheating a viable strategy’ (Boyer 2001, 186). Perhaps more unexpectedly, it has also been found 
that also overly unselfish group members are looked at with suspicion. Psychologists Craig D. 
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Parks and Asako B. Stone (2010) found that members  contributing generously to the group, 
without taking their full share of the benefits, were unwanted in the group by fair members, who 
felt that the generosity of the former made the latter look bad. It would perhaps be an interesting 
study  to  repeat  the  experiment  while  controlling  for  religiosity,  to  see  if  that  makes  any 
difference.
It should be apparent that the selective problem of cooperation is fraught with difficulties, and 
not only because it seems to be a mix of individual and group selection. We need to take great 
care to understand exactly what mechanisms are at work. In the example of the peafowl, there is 
a strict correspondence between the desired trait (good health) and the signal (splendid tail). It 
need not be entirely impossible to grow a splendid tail while in poor health, but what matters is 
that the signal is reliable enough to offset the cost. No conscious effort is required—the peahen 
may well choose her mate only for his dazzling colours, with no concern for offspring, as long as 
this preference leads to her mating with a fitter mate than without it. The peacock, on the other 
side, will grow his tail whatever he thinks of it. But religious beliefs are not so simple. Many may 
uncritically adopt the religion of their parents, but belief is at least potentially open to conscious 
decision.  Does  it  make  a  difference  if  belief  is  just  the  result  of  blind  selection,  or  if  each 
practitioner consciously evaluates what she stands to gain by adopting the group’s beliefs? This is 
a question that needs to be taken seriously when considering religion to be adaptive, to which we 
will return later (4.2).
3.3: Religion as a By-product
The  main  by-product  hypothesis  of  religion  concerns  the  ‘hyperactive  agency  detector,’  or 
HADD for short. This is a purported mind module that anthropologist Justin L. Barrett (2004) , 
following Stewart Guthrie (1980; 1993), argues evolved to avoid predators, but now mainly serves 
to induce religious belief. This is supposed to work because throughout most of our evolution, it 
has been adaptive to over-detect agency in our surroundings, because while over-detecting agency 
is not especially costly, under-detecting it in an environment where other agents might well have  
a good mind to eat you is an evolutionary nonstarter. Furthermore, minds prone to detecting 
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agency where there is none, are, according to Barrett, likely to attribute that unseen presence to 
gods. 
The  second  most  important  component  of  by-product-theories  is  the  idea  of  minimally 
counter-intuitive concepts (MCI). This idea stems from Sperber and Atran in the early 1980s, and 
was  presented in its  current  form by Boyer  a  decade  later  (Bulbulia  2009b).  He writes  that 
‘certain combinations of intuitive and counter-intuitive claims constitute a cognitive optimum, in 
which a concept is both learnable and nonnatural’ (Boyer 1994, 121). A potentially religious idea  
that violates too many ontological expectations becomes impossible to learn, but if it violates too 
few, it is ‘ipso facto, nonreligious and has little attention-demanding power’ (Ibid., 122).
Neither of these are unproblematic assumptions. Barrett  himself, writing about HADD in 
2008, asserts that ‘no experimental evidence exists in support of this agency detection device 
playing any role in religious belief formation or transmission, let alone the role that context 
effects might impact the relative sensitivity or accuracy of this device’ (Gibson and Barrett 2008, 
334). In fact, Geertz and Markússon note that ‘repeated, demonstrated false alarms from HADD 
should  equally  reinforce beliefs  in non-theistic,  natural  explanations’  (Geertz and Markússon 
2010, 157) MCI concepts, on the other hand, have been demonstrated to be less memorable than 
intuitive ones (Atran 2002, 103), however they do seem to play a role in drawing attention to 
belief  sets  mostly  composed  of  intuitive  ideas  (Ibid.,  106).  But,  can  they  motivate  religious 
commitment and costly behaviour?
By-product theories of religion in particular face ‘the Mickey Mouse’ problem (Atran 1998, 
602). That investigative, talking little rodent is surely as counter-intuitive as most gods, yet no 
one seems to worship him. Apparently, he is not the first character that comes to mind when 
people are out operating their hyperactive agency detectors, either. Lest you think worshipping a 
cartoon mouse is too ridiculous a proposition to consider, the problem has also been posed as the 
Zeus problem (Gervais and Henrich 2010).2 If god concepts are cognitively optimal, what is it 
that makes different concepts optimal for different people? Both these problems demonstrate that 
however relevant HADD and MCI might be to the development of religious ideas, they are not 
2 Not to be confused with the Zeus problem of classical studies, discussed in Conacher, D.J., Aeschylus’ Prometheus  
bound: a literary commentary. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980.
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the whole story. Social psychologist Will M. Gervais and anthropologist Joseph Henrich stress  
the  importance  of  context,  criticising  cognitive  approaches  for  a  one-sided focus  on  content 
(Ibid.). Religious context will be further elaborated on in the section on cultural selection, below 
(4.4).
It  is  also  important  to  remember  that  not  all  religious  concepts  are minimally  counter-
intuitive. Some are full-on bizarre, ‘extremely hard to learn and pass on.’ Anthropologist Harvey 
Whitehouse suggests  that both these forms of  religious belief  are  important,  using a slightly  
modified  form of  Michael  Tomasello’s  ‘ratchet  effect’  (Tomasello  1999).  A  ratchet  does  two 
things: it holds the bolt in its place, and turns it around. By analogy, Whitehouse suggests that  
the ‘holding’ function is fulfilled by MCI beliefs, which are easily enough attained to serve as a  
more or less constant background in religious traditions.  The ‘turning’  effect corresponds to 
‘those aspects of  religion that build up, cumulatively, over time… essentially an evolutionary 
process’ (Whitehouse 2008, 37). Contributing to this category are the religious innovators, with 
their complex revelations. This agrees with Boyer’s ‘tragedy of the theologian,’  which is that 
people misunderstanding religious ideas will distort them and add new ones, and ‘that the only 
way  to  make  the  message  immune  to  such  adulteration  renders  it  tedious,  thereby  fuelling 
imagistic dissent and threatening the position of the theologian’s guild’ (Boyer 2001, 285).
It  is  interesting to note in this  context that Whitehouse’s theory of ‘modes of religiosity’  
describes three ways, consecutively evolved, in which religion is acquired that seem roughly to 
correspond to the three first sections of this chapter. The first, ‘species-typical and more or less  
invariable, consisting of naturally “catchy” concepts’ (Whitehouse 2008, 38) seems to agree with 
the  idea  of  MCI  concepts  as  a  by-product  of  evolution.  The  second,  the  ‘imagistic  mode’ 
corresponds with intense social  cohesion,  exclusivity,  low uniformity and complex,  typically 
esoteric revelations, seemingly compatible with religion as an adaptation for group cooperation 
(Whitehouse 2002, 309). The third and final mode he calls the ‘doctrinal mode,’ characterised by  
high transmissive frequency, large-scale and rapid spread, and learned ritual meaning (Ibid.). This, 
arguably,  has  a  strong  ring  of  the  third  alternative  of  the  present  chapter,  namely  religion 
evolving by itself. This indicates that the three approaches are not so incompatible as perhaps 
some assume.
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3.4: By-product for Us, Adaptive Unto Itself? 
As mentioned earlier, one of the most important considerations when studying adaptations is the 
level  at  which  adaptation  is  supposed  to  operate.  An  obvious  example  is  adaptations  at  an 
individual level that are detrimental to group welfare, but adaptations can also happen at the level 
of religion itself. Richard Dawkins coined the term meme for a unit of culture (Dawkins 2006, ch. 
11), behaving in principle like a gene. The basic idea is that memes that are better at getting  
copied  will  predominate—for  instance,  a  religion  that  contained  a  proselytizing  element,  or 
meme, would spread better than a religion where missionary activity was looked down at, and all 
else being equal, would eventually ‘win out.’ These memes need host organisms, but otherwise 
are mainly independent of selection at the gene level. In this way, religious memes can exploit 
mental preferences that evolved for entirely unrelated purposes, to facilitate their own spread. As 
such, our adoption of religion would be a by-product of big brains capable of culture, but it  
would still be wrong to say that religion was not adaptive, because it would indeed be, unto itself.  
According to memeticists, religion’s purpose is for the religious memes to replicate.
When Dawkins proposed the idea in 1976, he meant it more as a thought experiment, and it  
took almost twenty years before the idea was taken seriously. Then, from 1997 to 2005, an online 
Journal of Memetics was published (Best et al.), but when no significant progress was made after 
eight years, the journal was discontinued, and memetics is generally considered a failed endeavour 
today (Edmonds 2005).  However,  it  is  worth mentioning that  it  is  not  the basic  premise  of 
memetics that was in dispute. Memetics is a fairly straightforward extension of natural selection, 
well compatible with what Dennett has called ‘the Darwinian Algorithm’ (Dennett 1995, 48–51). 
The problem was mainly that no one was able to properly operationalise the concept, as memes 
elude  definition  in  several  respects.  And whereas  genetic  evolution  is  mediated  through  the 
brilliantly adapted DNA molecule, a meme too vague even for definition seems only to allow for 
very weak selection at best. A related objection to memetics is that cultural transmission is of too 
low fidelity—for instance, every time a story is retold, it changes, and presumably too much for 
evolution to work (Benítez-Bribiesca 2001).
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Nevertheless, memetics is not the only candidate for a theory of cultural evolution. One of 
the  more  intriguing  is  Robert  Boyd  and  Peter  J.  Richerson’s  cultural  selectionism,  or  dual 
inheritance theory, as it emphasises the importance both of genetic and cultural transmission 
(Boyd and Richerson 1985; 2005; Richerson and Boyd 2005). They claim that because of the 
particularities of culture, it can evolve even without a unit of selection, and thus their theory 
avoids the main problem of memetics. To understand this, we need to remember that genetic  
evolution depends on the particulate inheritance of traits. Save for mutations, genes are passed 
down intact from parent to offspring—for any given locus, you are likely to inherit either your 
father’s gene or your mother’s. If instead genes had been mixed, so that each of your genes had  
been an average  of  your father  and your mother,  this  averaging  process  would  ‘use  up’  the 
variation  required  for  evolution.  It  is  worth  noting  that  because  of  the  DNA  molecule’s 
extraordinary copying fidelity,  mutation rates are generally surprisingly low: research on the 
roundworm  Caenohabditis elegans has revealed mutation rates as low as 2.1 × 10-8 per site per 
generation, which amounts to 2.1 new mutations per worm (Denver et al. 2000). Mutation rates 
vary among species, but not by much (Freeman and Herron 2007, 148). Boyd and Richerson’s  
theory elegantly lets the two main flaws of memetics cancel each other out. No unit could be 
found, and variation was too high. But a unit of selection is only required when mutation rates 
are too low to maintain variation by itself. Errors of transmission, abundant in culture, will ‘keep 
pumping variation into a population as blending bleeds it away’ (Richerson and Boyd 2005, 88).
Whatever the mechanics of cultural evolution, it is likely a force to be reckoned with, and the  
possibility that religion exists at least partly for its own sake, should be seriously considered.  
Note that this scenario is a true combination of both the by-product and adaptationist view. If 
religion exists for its own sake, then it could not be our adaptation, but rather our willingness to 
embrace religion would be a by-product of some or other mental predisposition. At the same 
time, just as genetic evolution produces adaptations, so does cultural evolution. And as a product  
of cultural evolution, religion would likely be adapted to us, its hosts. To see how this might 
work, we will examine a few examples of religion as an evolving entity in itself.
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Long-time critic  of  religion Richard Dawkins  wrote  a short  paper on what he saw to be 
‘Viruses  of  the  Mind’  (Dawkins  1993),  referring to  what  he  saw as  a  pathological  spread of  
religious memes. He emphasises the human mind’s susceptibility to memetic infections.  Like 
with cells and hard disks hosting viruses, brains have two qualities in particular that allow for  
this: ‘firstly, a readiness to replicate information accurately, perhaps with some mistakes that are 
subsequently reproduced accurately; and, secondly, a readiness to obey instructions encoded in 
the information so replicated’ (Ibid., 19). Dawkins also shows runaway selection to be at work in 
religion: He cites a rabbi taking pride in keeping kosher precisely because they are meaningless 
(Ibid, 22), and a televangelist claiming that ‘God really appreciates a donation… only when that 
donation is so large that it hurts’ (Ibid,  24). Note that runaway selection works in a slightly 
different way here than in the standard adaptationist view of religion. On that view, excessive  
ritual is to display group commitment, so that other members know that cooperation will not be 
wasted. According to the memetic view, however, it is more of a kinship function: excessive ritual 
demonstrates that religious memes are present. Then, if there is a religious meme instructing its  
hosts (practitioners) to help other religious practitioners, then this will confer a fitness benefit to 
likely carriers of that same meme. For example, such a meme might cause a religious person to 
sacrifice his life for those of two of his faith. As they likely carry that same meme, one would be 
sacrificed to save two. This would be adaptive behaviour on the part of the meme, although not  
necessarily on the host’s genes.
While primarily a proponent of a more standard by-product theory, Pascal Boyer’s hypothesis  
about religious guilds (Boyer 2001, 273–285) is clearly concerned with cultural evolution. Boyer 
suggests  that  as  literacy arose,  so did a  class  of  scribes.  These scribes,  Boyer  argues,  became 
involved in the production of religious texts and formed guilds to protect their interests and 
control the market. However, unlike other guilds, the religious guilds sold services which could 
be imitated by outsiders. They compensated for this by trying to gain political influence. Note 
that according to Boyer’s argument, this need not be an inherent preference for religious groups,  
but  rather,  those who happen to seek political  influence are  those that  prevail—or,  in  more 
evolutionary terms, political influence is selected for. In other words, when considering guilds, 
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religiousness is not an adaptation of people, for political power, but an adaptation of religions, for 
outcompeting other religions.
3.5: Summary
I have examined the problem of defining religion, and three approaches to the question of its 
adaptedness.  For the evolutionary science  of  religion to thrive,  I  believe a  number of  issues 
pertaining to these must be addressed. First off, we need to be explicit about what it is that is  
being studied. A trait cannot be said to be an adaptation if we are not sure what that trait is.  
Second, we need to examine what mechanisms of selection are operative, and where. Does blind 
selection  decide  for  us  whether  or  not  we  should  believe,  or  are  we  mediators  of  cultural 
selection, evaluating whether or not religions are beneficial for us? Third, if not adaptations, then 
what?  Merely  suggesting  that  religion  is  a  spandrel  is  not  enough,  without  positing  some 
alternative force that keeps the spandrels in their place. Something so complex and influential as  
religion can hardly expect to be untouched by selection, unless some stronger force outweighs it.
IV  
DISCUSSION
aving surveyed the debate in both biology and the science of religion, it is  
now time to follow the threads, and see what new insights we can gleam 
based  on  the  presentation  of  the  biological  adaptation  debate.  I  believe 
several points have been missed in the discussion so far, and need to be taken seriously by 
future research.
H
First of  all,  we can do well  to be clearer about what we are studying. Just claiming 
religion to be an adaptation or not is  too simplistic—we need to investigate thoroughly 
what  the  relevant  traits  are,  and  only  then  ask  about  their  adaptive  status.  Second,  if 
selection  is  so  good  at  undermining  cooperation,  and  religion  is  an  adaptation  for 
cooperating, why aren’t cheaters outnumbering believers? Does not an adaptive theory of 
religion require the help of fortunate constraints? Third, if religion is not an adaptation, but 
a by-product, is it not too significant for selection to ignore it? What constraining forces do 
by-product theories of religion assume, if any? Fourth, for a cultural science, surprisingly 
little  attention has been paid to the possibility that there might be selection acting on 
different  cultural  variants.  If  this  was  to  be  given  serious  thought,  what  might  the 
implications be for a science of religion? And finally, are adaptations ‘good?’ Is there any 
danger of confusion when discussing the benefit of religion? Is the benefit to us, our genes,  
or to religion itself?
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4.1: What’s a Trait?
Philosopher of biology Tim Lewens has argued that ‘one of the most significant lessons that the 
Spandrels  paper  teaches  is  about  the  importance  for  evolutionary  biology  of  an  empirically 
grounded account of what is, and what is not, a trait’ (Lewens 2008, 180). With all the debate 
about how to define the subject matter, this is a problem easily applicable to the evolutionary 
science of religion.
First of all,  we need ask what we are looking for—is it religion or religiousness? However 
religion is defined, it is not a trait that people can have. One can adhere to a religion, but one 
cannot ‘have religion.’ Religions are sets of culturally specific practices and beliefs, with a far  
greater variance than can be explained by genes alone (cf. Aunger 2002, 41–46). Religiousness, on 
the other hand, is more likely to be a biological phenomenon (although it need not be, if religion 
is a cultural phenomenon altogether). In other words, if there is something biologically adaptive 
to religion, it is the tendency to acquire it, namely religiousness. If, on the other hand, we are 
considering cultural adaptation (as we will return to in 4.4), then ‘religion’ is what we’re after.  
The most pressing concern, however, is the near-universal human propensity for religiousness, so 
we will start there.
Thus,  we  need  to  identify  the  different  aspects  of  religiousness  in  humans,  and  examine 
whether  they  might  be  independent  traits,  or  aspects  of  the  same  trait.  Lewens  suggests  a  
complication: Some traits might be so strongly linked through developmental constraints that 
they cannot really be considered separate traits at all, although they seem to be (Ibid: 166). His 
example is a scenario where it would be optimal to have short forelimbs and long hind-limbs, but 
where linkage reduces the available traits to long or short limbs, period. Perhaps also in religion, 
some practice which in itself is entirely maladaptive is so intricately linked to an adaptive practice  
that they must be considered two aspects of the same trait. This is the old by-product argument 
again,  but  we should remember that  it  can be valid  for adaptive religious  traits  as  well—for 
example, private rituals might just be a by-product of public ‘signalling’ rituals.
Furthermore,  we  should  seriously  consider  whether  some  traits  commonly  assigned  to 
religiousness might be adaptations while other traits are not. This is implicit in Sosis’ assumption 
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that ‘cognitive, emotional, and behavioral elements were exapted for use in a complex system of 
communication, cooperation, and coordination, namely the religious system’ (Sosis 2009, 323). 
Here,  a  by-product  such  as  HADD  is  a  fundamental  component  of  an  adaptive  system of 
commitment signalling. There is no need to commit to a view of religion as either an adaptation 
or a by-product.
There is a possibility, however, that religion does exist as an adaptive system—a collection of 
traits  where  the  collection  itself  is  an  adaptation  (Purzycki,  Haque,  and Sosis  forthcoming). 
Purzycki et al. compares religion to the immune system, which they claim no one would argue ‘is 
not an adaptation, yet we find no one claiming that there is a particular locus of this adaptation 
since the system is composed of a number of interacting units and they must function together to 
maintain the defensive capabilities of organisms against infectious microorganisms’ (Ibid., 4). This 
is certainly a possibility, yet it cannot be taken for granted in the way adaptationists seem to have 
done  in  the  past.  And  again,  one  does  not  exclude  the  other—different  religions  may have 
different  evolutionary  trajectories.  When it  comes  to  religiousness,  however,  the  situation  is 
different. The human genome is ‘remarkably poor in polymorphism’ (Bertranpetit et al. 2004,  
81), and we should perhaps not expect the biological trait of religiosity to vary much—although 
that question possibly warrants a study in itself.
To sum up, then, the adaptive status of  religion, as a cultural phenomenon, may vary from 
case to case, and even within each case: a religion may consist of adaptive and non-adaptive traits 
both,  or it  may be an adaptive system. The same is  the case with  religiosity,  construed as a 
biological trait, although here, the answer seems less likely to vary between populations. In other 
words, if the tendency for religiousness is found, for example, to be an adaptive system in one 
group, it is likely to be an adaptive system in all groups. At the same time, different religions may 
well differ in adaptive status. The take-home lesson, at any rate, is that the question ‘is religion 
adaptive?’ is far too simplified and need to be refined by distinguishing between religion as a 
cultural trait and religiousness as a biological trait, and opening up for the possibility that both 
may be composed of sub-traits of varying adaptive status.
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4.2: Adaptive Constraints
Although commonly considered in opposition to  selection,  constraints  can have  an adaptive 
element, too. If, as shown in chapter 2.5, selection can produce suboptimal traits, then it follows 
that constraints acting on such selection are beneficial. A typical victim of untimely selection is  
cooperation: Although, under the right conditions, everyone would benefit by cooperating, free 
riders would benefit even more, and outcompete cooperators. But cooperation is just the thing 
adaptationist explanations claim that religion promotes—thus, assuming that religion exists to 
promote cooperation and free riders would have an advantage over true believers, something has  
to constrain the evolution of free riders. However, an adaptive, widespread constraint seems too 
good to be true. Unlike adaptations, constraints cannot proliferate on account of being adaptive, 
which makes it hard to explain how religious cooperation can be so ubiquitous as it might seem.  
If the natural tendency of evolution is to select for free riders in the face of cooperation, and  
religions all over the world are centred on cooperation, how is it that free riding is constrained in 
all of them? It is hard to see how something so obviously beneficial as free riding could be subject  
to a constraint that would apply to all  of the world’s religions (or most, if  religion-as-costly-
signalling only explains a subset of all religions).
Let us examine again our list of seven constraints, to see if any of them might explain how free 
riding does not arise in religious communities, or at least arises seldom enough to make hard-to-
fake signalling of commitment a significant explanation of religion. These are: (1) time lags, (2) 
historical constraints, (3) available genetic variation, (4) constraints of costs and materials,  (5) 
imperfections at one level due to selection at another level, (6) mistakes due to environmental 
unpredictability, and (7) developmental constraints.  To begin with, examining (2), (3), and (7) 
cannot be explored in this thesis, but it is hard anyway to see how they could work against free 
riding, which evidently,  at  least  in other settings,  is  within the range of human phenotypes. 
Constraints  (1)  and  (6)  seem  highly  unlikely  given  the  already  long  history  of  human 
religiousness, and (4) is also implausible—how can paying less for group benefits be constrained 
by cost? Sosis’ claim that believers perceive costs differently (Sosis 2003) could well explain why 
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believers are  constrained  from free  riding,  but  it  cannot  explain  why  unbelief  is  not  more 
common.
The final sort of constraint is in fact selected for, although not by virtue of its constraining  
element. The lack of free rider evolution could be seen as (5) imperfections on one level due to 
selection  at  another  level,  if  we  see  the  group  as  that  other  level.  If  in  fact  free  riding  is 
constrained by group-level selection for altruism, as particularly David Sloan Wilson argues, then 
strong  group  selection  pressures  could  explain  why  such  a  constraint  is  so  widespread  as  
signalling theories of religion apparently requires it to be. In fact, the fit with the data might be  
very good—while under other constraints (2, 3 and 7 in particular), the constrained genotype is  
often entirely unavailable, constraint (5) merely implies that it will be selected against on another 
level. In the case of free riding, although group-level selection for altruism will constrain it, there 
could still be some selection for it on the level of genes. This agrees with Sloan Wilson’s claim  
that  selfish behaviour will  be selected for  within groups,  while  between-group selection will 
promote  altruism  (D.  S.  Wilson  1975).  Even  though  religion  in  general  might  be  strongly 
cooperative, one easily imagines new atheists such as Dawkins having a field day looking for  
examples of free riders in religion—certain televangelists with double standards come to mind.
Whatever the exact mechanism of constraint, this is an area where adaptationist theories of  
religion have failed. While they do explain how religion can be adaptive, they do not properly 
explain  how free riding whilst merely faking religious commitment is not common enough to 
thwart religion’s adaptive function. Saying that belief is generated merely by performing rituals 
(Sosis 2003) might well be a step in the right direction, but what is needed is an explanation for 
why no ‘defence’  against  this  mechanism has  evolved—an ability  to  fake  commitment  when 
needed, while avoiding paying the costs of co-operation whenever it is possible.
4.3: Alternatives to Selection
If lessons from biology have been disregarded in incorporating an evolutionary framework to the 
study of religion, arguably the greatest neglect concerns by-product theories. There is some irony 
here: The same error that Gould and Lewontin accused adaptationists of is brazenly committed 
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now in the name of by-products. But as the ‘spandrels’ controversy showed, claiming traits to be 
by-products requires  more work than assuming them to be adaptations. No such discussion is 
found concerning religion as a by-product, rather, religiousness is  seen simply as a secondary 
property of other, adaptive traits. But something as significant as religiousness is hardly likely to 
be without fitness effects—if these are positive, it hardly makes sense to call them by-products,  
and if they are negative, what constraints are limiting selection working against them?
A look  at  biological  by-products  might  be  instructive.  When  a  gene  has  more  than  one 
phenotypic  effect,  it  is  called  pleiotropy.  Its  secondary  effects  may  be  detrimental—this  is  
antagonistic pleiotropy. The classic example is senescence, or biological ageing (Williams 1957). 
Traits that are beneficial at a young age may well have deleterious side effects in old age, i.e. 
senescence is  the late onset  by-product of  adaptations.  For example,  the gene labelled p53 is 
integral to the body’s defence against cancerous cells, but also has the adverse effect of depleting 
stem cells, leading to ageing (Rodier, Campisi, and Bhaumik 2007). Antagonistic pleiotropy of 
this kind is possible because selective pressures are stronger around an individual’s reproductive 
peak than later in life—genes that cause their hosts to die before raising progeny will not last, but 
genes that only cause death later in life might (Freeman and Herron 2007, 494). If the benefits 
outweigh  the  cost,  antagonistically  pleiotropic  genes  can  spread.  As  such,  pleiotropy  is  yet 
another cause of suboptimality, in addition to the constraints and maladaptations mentioned in 
Chapter II.  But,  while these mechanisms in many cases effectively rule  out evolving optimal 
traits, pleiotropy may only be a delaying factor. Even though a selected-for gene has deleterious 
side effects, the possibility is still there for modifier genes to cancel out these (Dawkins 1999, 35). 
This does not always happen, as is evident from the depletion of stem cells by the p53 gene, 
mentioned above.  Still,  the possibility of  modifier  genes  show that  it  is  not  a  necessary by-
product, but one that could conceivably be selected away. If this does not happen, we are left 
with the possibility that the evolution of modifier genes has been constrained.
Whether by-products such as religiousness caused by HADD or MCI qualify as pleiotropic 
effects might depend on your outlook,1 however, the principle is the same—there’s no particular 
1 Typically, pleiotropy refers to two or more effects of a single gene, which is unlikely to be the case for religion (L. 
B. Koenig and McGue 2011). A case where several genes have an aggregate by-product, as is more likely here, does 
seem analogous, but I’m not certain that such a case warrants the use of the term ‘pleiotropy.’
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reason modifier genes should not evolve, unless (a) religiousness is either adaptive or neutral, or 
(b) evolution of modifier genes is constrained. If religiousness is adaptive, it is hard to show that it 
has not also been selected for, and as such, it makes no sense to speak of it as a by-product. To my 
knowledge,  no  one  has  demonstrated  religiousness  to  be  adaptively  neutral,  and  given  the 
significance of religion, it hardly seems likely that it is. To claim that religion is a by-product,  
then,  would  seem to  necessitate  an  examination  on what  factors  might  be  constraining  the 
evolution of modifier genes. Again, this seems to be lacking from the literature.
It is not inconceivable that religiousness really is a by-product, but it is a tall claim that needs  
to  be  rigorously  tested.  In  particular,  time  lags  and  lack  of  genetic  variation  seem  viable 
candidates for constraints on modifier genes, perhaps coupled with low selection pressure. Also, 
we should keep in mind that even though religiousness might be linked to other traits that are 
adaptations,  religiousness  could  be  an  adaptation  all  the  same.  As  Dennett  writes,  ‘every 
adaptation is one sort of exaptation or the other—this is trivial, since no function is eternal; if  
you go back far enough, you will find that every adaptation has developed out of predecessor 
structures each of which either had some other use or no use at all’ (Dennett 1995, 281). In other 
words,  if  a  trait  is  adaptive,  it  will  be  selected  for  its  adaptive  function,  and  in  time,  be  
indistinguishable in this regard from any adaptation. 
4.4: Biologically or Culturally Evolved Adaptations?
With  few  exceptions,  evolutionary  and  cognitive  scientists  of  religion  have  focused  on  the 
question of biological adaptation. It is my contention that this is unfortunate, and that a lot is to 
be gained by adding cultural  evolution to the  mix.  This  changes  the question of  adaptation 
radically: While a biological adaptation outperforms the alternatives in spreading certain genes, a 
cultural adaptation spreads (thus far loosely defined) bits of culture. The relationship between the 
two might well be symbiotic, but it need not be; In particular, memeticists have been fond of 
seeing culture in terms of viruses (Dawkins 1993; Brodie 1995).  Richerson and Boyd put the 
matter succinctly, writing that ‘if we fail to find the predicted sorts of maladaptations that derive  
from the Darwinian theory of cultural evolution, the whole theory is suspect’ (Richerson and 
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Boyd 2005, 151). By this they mean that since genes and culture are transmitted differently, their  
criteria of success are different too, and we should expect that in some cases, conflicts will arise. If 
cultural  evolution  really  is  a  significant  force,  then,  we  should  expect  it  to  have  serious 
implications for any evolutionary theory of religion.
Here, I am concerned mainly with adaptive theories of religion. I mentioned earlier (3.2) that 
whether selection for belief is conscious or not is important, and this is what I had in mind.  
Imagine on the one hand that the cost-benefit analysis of whether to believe is made purely by 
selection acting on genes, and on the other hand that we are equipped with a capacity for making 
cost-benefit calculations in questions of religious affiliation. These are distinct scenarios. The first 
in particular faces the free rider problem, because natural selection is blind to perceived benefits.  
It is not inconceivable that, coupled with actual belief, religiosity can be selected for on a genetic  
level, but perhaps it is easier to assume that humans assess the costs and benefits of joining a  
religion? In this case, it suddenly becomes entirely plausible that the benefit of joining a religion  
is wrongly evaluated. This need not happen on a conscious level, what is important is that the 
mechanism for selecting a religion is divorced from the actual benefits it is supposed to confer. In 
standard natural selection, this is not the case: If the selective environment calls for sharp teeth, 
sharp teeth will be selected for the benefit to their owners. The alternative is a kind of selection 
by proxy: A mental cost-benefit evaluation module of sorts is selected for its general prowess in  
identifying adaptive strategies,  but as long as it works well  enough on average for continued 
selection, any strategy that can fool the module will be just as likely to be chosen as a correctly 
identified good strategy. A strategy, on this view, is a unit of cultural selection, selected not for its  
direct benefit to genes, but rather its fit with a genetically evolved bias. In this context, a religion 
is such a strategy. Religions promise that by paying certain costs, benefits will be obtained, and 
while the benefits are typically inflated (eternal life in heaven, &c), the costs are played down, for 
example by presenting them as virtues.
On this view, the free rider problem becomes less pressing. Because cultural selection can 
operate much faster than biological selection, time lag becomes a perfectly acceptable explanation 
for why free riders do not appear in greater numbers. Remember that on this view, a religion’s  
criterion for success is not any of the biological ones that free riding would optimize, but rather 
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the fit with a mechanism of detecting good strategies. In other words, a religion that promises  
great benefits can be selected over a religion that actually delivers such benefits.
The costs of group membership imposed by religions may in fact suggest cultural evolution in 
yet another way. Richerson and Boyd (2005, 183), using the Amish as an example, point out that 
the high standard of asceticism in fact acts as a cultural defence against ‘the flow of ideas from the 
world of the flesh.’ In other words, costly signals might not be signals at all, but rather cultural  
adaptations of religions to keep its adherents preoccupied with that religion. As with so many of 
the scenarios presented in this thesis, however, one does not preclude the other, and cultural  
selection and religious signalling may well exist in a symbiotic relationship.
There is another context where cultural evolution will be relevant. In scenarios where religion 
benefits a powerful minority, such as in Boyer’s hypothesis of the religious guilds (Boyer 2001, 
273–285; 3.4 above), it is unlikely that the benefit is to genes, because religious affiliation is not 
transmitted genetically. Adopted children do not preserve the culture of their biological parents, 
but the one they are brought up in (Richerson and Boyd 2005, 39). That religious leaders in fact 
do benefit from their position is not necessarily relevant, as long as a significant portion of them 
are celibate,  or otherwise hold positions that are not hereditary. Some cases,  where religious 
positions are hereditary, could perhaps be explained biologically with reference to this benefit,  
but for the rest, the evolutionary benefit of religious power and influence seems to be to the 
religions themselves. Whether the beneficiary is a lineage of priests or a religion, the parallel to 
extended  phenotypes  is  worth  pointing  out:  Dawkins  demonstrated  that  traits  may  well  be 
produced by forces extrinsic to the host organism, and there is no reason to assume that the same 
process cannot operate with respect to religion.
The idea that culture evolves in its own right is far from new, but unfortunately, it has not  
received the attention it deserves. Even if the hypothesis outlined above should turn out to be 
mistaken, the possibility of a kind of evolution not predicated on gene reproduction drastically 
changes our understanding of what is going on. The apparent failure of memetics should not  
deter us from investigating other ways in which culture might evolve. At any rate, we should 
recognise that culture is a force to be reckoned with when it comes to human evolution, even if it 
should turn out—and I hazard it won’t—that mapping the evolution of culture itself is futile. 
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4.5: Who Needs Adaptation?
As mentioned, scholars favouring a by-product approach to religion tend to be more critical of  
religion than adaptationists. It is worth reminding that although we are all products of evolution, 
by now we have reached a level of complexity such that we need no longer share evolution’s 
‘goal’ of mere proliferation. Indeed, we have attained a level of fitness so extreme that we might  
soon overpopulate the earth, if we have not already. Our genes might act as if it was in their  
interest to proliferate indefinitely, but it certainly is not in ours. That said, adaptive behaviour 
often, perhaps ordinarily, coincides with our interests, and it is not absurd to suggest that there is, 
at least, some loose correlation between how adaptive religion is, and how good it is for us. But 
these  need not be linked. It is worth examining endorsements of religion to see if the traits in 
question are really adaptations, or just incidentally good for us. It is also worth examining the 
apparent linkage between critique of religion and assuming it to be a by-product, on the one 
hand, and approval of religion and seeing it as an adaptation, on the other hand.
A common argument is that religiousness is conducive to improved mental health (Grinde 
1998, 25; Sanderson 2008, 150; McGuire and Tiger 2009, 133). While the point can well be made 
that this might improve individual fitness (Grinde 1998, 24), we should remember that religion 
also creates a significant amount of anxiety (Boyer 2001, 20; L. Kirkpatrick 2008, 64), and also 
that mental health problems are likely to be a fairly recent phenomenon, evolutionarily speaking 
(E. O. Smith 2002). General claims about religion’s positive health effects have also been made 
(Ferriss 2002; H. G. Koenig, McCullough, and Larson 2001; H. G. Koenig and Cohen 2002), but 
here,  too,  we  should  be  careful  to  make  inferences  from  a  longer  post-reproductive  life  to 
adaptation (L. Kirkpatrick 2008, 64)—a possible, but not necessary connection.
We should perhaps remember to look at this from the other side, as well. Some adaptations 
can, however good they are for spreading genes, be bad for society. Cooperation might sound like 
something we cannot get enough of, but armies, crime syndicates and terrorist organisations rely 
on cooperation, too. As Matt Ridley, following George Williams, puts it, ‘preferring the morality 
of group selection to the ruthlessness of individual struggle is to prefer genocide to murder …. It 
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is a rule of evolution to which we are far from immune that the more cooperative societies are, 
the more violent the battles between them’ (Ridley 1998, 193).
Another possibility is that adaptive traits of religions used to be good for us, but are not any 
longer.  That  religion  at  least  has  the  potential  to  increase  fertility  is  well  documented (e.g.,  
Janssen and Hauser 1981; Heaton 1986; Sosis 2003; Frejka and Westoff 2007), and that might have 
been a desired effect in the past. But at seven billion people, struggling with inequality and an  
escalating climate crisis, more fertility is arguably the last thing we need now.
It might be that not very many confuse adaptation and what is good for us psychologically,  
morally, &c, but it should be worth pointing out that the two are at best loosely connected.  
Religion might be a by-product and true at the same time, as observant Christian and by-product  
theorist Justin L. Barrett would testify (Henig 2007), or it might be adaptive, yet false and bad for  
us. Nature, it seems, does not care one way or the other.
4.6: Summary
If my analysis has been correct, a close examination of the adaptation discourse in biology has 
indeed  been  fruitful,  and  a  number  of  questions  warrant  closer  inspection.  First,  the  very 
question of religion’s adaptedness needs refinement; Are we talking about religion as a cultural  
phenomenon,  or  the  biological  trait  religiousness?  And  can  these  be  further  subdivided—is 
religiousness a single trait, or is propensity to perform ritual one and belief another, for instance? 
Second, why do not cheaters thwart religious cooperation? If belief is a group-level adaptation,  
then unbelief should be the individual’s optimal reply. Is this happening? Third, if religions or  
religiousness does not serve an adaptive purpose, what constraints hinder selection's removal of 
them? Fourth, can studying cultural evolution bring new insights to the study of religion? Is  
religiousness biologically adaptive, or is it merely religion that is a cultural adaptation, which by 
chance happens to be adaptive for us as well? Is it a mix of the two? And fifth, are we taking the  
requisite care to avoid confusing adaptive benefit with benefit to us? These are all questions the 
evolutionary science of religion needs to take seriously. With any luck, pursuing them will lead 
to new insights into our fascinating subject.

V  
CONCLUSION
urveying the literature on adaptation has prompted several hopefully interesting 
questions,  but  what  are  the  broader  implications  of  all  this?  The evolutionary 
approach to religion is still  only a minority endeavour, so for most students of 
religion, the questions posed here are not even considered relevant. I argue in the following 
that the evolutionary framework should be the natural choice for future studies of religion, 
and that this will greatly improve compatibility with other sciences. Second, I argue that 
the strong division in the evolutionary sciences  of  religion is  ill-advised,  and call  for  a 
synthesis between the two views.
S
5.1: The Need for an Evolutionary Approach
A good century ago, the promising project of applying the already successful concept of 
evolution  to  the  humanities  and  social  sciences  was  tainted  by  an  overly  simplistic 
approach, and the implication of primitive societies as inferior. One is tempted to speculate 
that the association with social Darwinism and the massive collective trauma of World War 
II did not help that project’s esteem, either. But the continued reluctance of social scientists  
to adopt evolutionary approaches can be hard to understand. Darwinism is arguably the 
greatest  success  story of  modern science,  and human beings  are  undeniably  Darwinian 
subject matter. At the same time, possibly the greatest threat to public acceptance of science 
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(aside  from the  dreadful  denial  of  climate  change)  is  found  in  opposition  to  the  theory  of  
evolution. But how can we expect the man in the street to take evolution for a fact, when not  
even  scientists  can  agree  on  its  applicability?  Can  we  really  blame  people  for  questioning 
evolutionary theory if there is disagreement among scientists as to whether it is the theory that 
explains human nature? Granted, arguing that human nature is too complex for evolutionary 
studies  to  be  at  all  feasible  is  not  the  same as  arguing  that  evolution  is  irrelevant,  but  that 
distinction may well be lost on those without scientific training who are weighing arguments of  
evolutionary theory versus creationism. In the worst case, by not studying the humanities in an 
evolutionary framework, not only are we missing out on valuable insights, but we are potentially 
undermining public respect for scientific findings. 
Evolutionary approaches to religion have been criticised, sometimes with good reason, for 
being arrogant and hostile to other perspectives (Rydving 2008). While this could go some way in 
explaining why they have not been more successful,  it  is  of  course entirely irrelevant to the 
validity  of  the  theories.  One might  also  add that  an  even graver  sort  of  arrogance  is  being 
committed by those who reject evolutionary explanations—denying the relevance of the theory 
that accounts for the origin of our subject matter (at least for the social sciences in general) is not  
to be done lightly. So why this reluctance?
The critique seems to have a handful of reasons, none of which amount to any reason to shy  
away from evolutionary approaches. I will call them (1) genetic determinism, (2) territoriality, (3) 
nothing new, (4) erroneous research, and (5) applicability. By ‘genetic determinism,’ I’m thinking 
of  the  belief  that  an  evolutionary  approach  necessarily  reduces  everything  to  genes,  greatly 
simplifying the issues at hand. ‘Territoriality’ refers to the fear that biologists might encroach on 
the social sciences. ‘Nothing new’ is the claim that evolutionary approaches don’t add any new 
insights, but merely frame them in a new way. ‘Erroneous research’ concerns critique against 
findings,  and ‘applicability’  refers  to whether these approaches can be utilised in all  relevant 
questions.
Claims of genetic determinism have plagued evolutionary biology (Dawkins 1982, ch. 2), and 
there is every reason to believe that scepticism against evolutionary sciences are based at least 
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partly on beliefs that they reduce all explanation to genes. As Dawkins and others have noted,  
this  is  simply  not  true—Richerson  and  Boyd  suggest  that  rather  than  looking  at  genes  as 
blueprints, we should think of them as recipes where ‘the ingredients, cooking temperature and 
so on are set by the environment’ (Richerson and Boyd 2005, 9). But there is a broader, more 
interesting point here: Reductionism. For someone studying the complexities of the humanities,  
wariness of reductionism is understandable, but I argue rather that reductionism be embraced 
enthusiastically. Recall the arguments about adaptationism—although other forces than selection 
undoubtedly are operable at times, investigating them is often so difficult, that headway can only 
be made with the simplifying assumption of adaptation. Economical first guesses are just that—
they don’t burn any bridges, and we can revise our findings later, if new evidence comes to light. 
E. O. Wilson neatly sums up the issue, writing that ‘[c]omplexity is what interests scientists in  
the  end,  not  simplicity.  Reductionism is  the  way to  understand  it.  The  love  of  complexity 
without reductionism makes art; the love of complexity with reductionism makes science’ (E. O. 
Wilson 1998, 59).
It is easy to argue that territoriality shouldn’t be a problem, but the fear is perhaps harder to 
assuage.  Quite  simply,  if  evolutionary  approaches  turn  out  to  be  the  best  tool  to  studying 
religion, then we should welcome the change, and adapt accordingly. Psychologically, of course, 
it  might not be so easy for scholars well  set  in their  ways.  I  can think of no better way to  
persuade such scholars to adapt evolutionary approaches than to demonstrate that they produce 
convincing results, accommodate complexity, and not least, are extraordinarily interesting. But 
most  of  all,  territoriality  isn’t  a  real  argument—one  must  hope  that  in  the  end,  the  fittest 
alternative prevails.
So what about those who claim that incorporating evolution accomplishes nothing new? Here 
I say only that translating findings about religion into a language shared with biology and other 
disciplines is hardly ‘nothing new.’ Even if really novel discoveries haven’t turned up yet—and I 
daresay they have—unifying the sciences, or trying our best to do so, is a worthy achievement in 
itself. Interdisciplinarity and unification should be a goal of all science, and for the science of 
religion, indeed all social sciences, biology and evolution seem the most natural allies.
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The final  two points  are taken in particular from Håkan Rydving’s (2008) critique of the 
cognitive science of religion (surely an evolutionary approach), and I will conflate them here—
not  because  they  are  identical,  but  because  the  solution  is.  First,  he  points  out  several  
methodological problems with a number of studies, and then he argues that cognitive theories 
are  inadequate  for  investigating  a  number  of  issues.  From what  I  can  see,  there  is  nothing 
fundamental with either of these complaints, and the solution is simply to work harder. Rydving 
even gives very specific suggestions as to how the studies in question can be improved—hardly 
something  he  could  do  if  the  discipline  was  fundamentally  flawed.  When  it  comes  to 
applicability, we have yet another reason to study cultural evolution; I think it would provide the  
flexibility needed to tackle the questions Rydving supposes cannot be answered with a cognitive 
approach alone, such as how Pentecostal movements vary so much in success in different Latin-
American countries. At any rate, for a discipline still in its infancy, the evolutionary science of  
religion seems to be doing remarkably well, although that’s not a defence we can keep rehearsing 
indefinitely.
In the end, I think a shift is inevitable, but if that is for the better, as I think it is, then it is the 
responsibility of the scientific community to speed up that shift. Evolution has been one of the 
greatest discoveries of science, and it produces staggering results. Biologists Scott Freeman and 
Jon C. Herron aptly comment on the theory’s predictive power: ‘If we had a theory that worked 
like that for picking stocks or race horses—well, we could have retired years ago’ (2007, 196). 
Granted, they were commenting flour beetles; human culture is likely to be orders of magnitude 
harder to untangle. It is very amusing when Pascal Boyer complains that it takes several chapters  
even to ‘approach a question that many people, in [his] experience, can solve to their satisfaction 
in a few seconds of dinner-table conversation’ (2001, 50), only to produce ‘the full history of all  
religion (ever)’ in two and a half short pages (ibid., 326-8), but of course it is not that simple.  
Evolution is a powerful tool, but not a magic bullet—yet more than good enough, I think, to 
embrace  wholeheartedly.  Incidentally, for  those  who  might  be  worried  that  evolutionary 
approaches will  focus on genetics  and biology to the detriment of  culture,  studying cultural  
evolution offers the prospect of giving culture its due within that framework. And what’s more,  
if  one  considers  that  a  constraint  is  really  any force  that  counteracts  natural  selection,  then 
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evolutionary theory easily accommodates rival theories—if a scholar thinks that evolutionary 
approaches are irrelevant because theory  x explains religion much better than natural selection 
does, then  x should be fairly easy to recast as a constraint on selection. In other words, rival 
theories can be construed as showing how selection has not been able to create the behaviour we 
would expect. Or: if selection has produced a given trait, then surely an evolutionary explanation 
is required; if, on the other hand, the trait in question is not an adaptation, evolutionary theory  
fully  accommodates  an  explanation  of  the  trait’s  origin  by  examining  how  selection  was 
constrained in that particular case. Not only does this have the benefit of increasing consilience,  
by presenting the theory in a scientific language that can and should be common to the social 
sciences and biology, but it is also a good way of confronting evolutionary theories. Evolution’s 
role in the origin of humanity is universally accepted,1 so a theory that claims that religion arose 
otherwise should at least account for how selection had no say in the matter of the origin of  
religion, not to mention why other evolutionary mechanisms such as constraints are disregarded.
In  short,  I  can  see  no  reason  to  stray  away  from an  evolutionary  approach  to  studying 
religion,  and  several  reasons  to  adopt  one.  Perhaps  the  most  important  of  these  is  that  an 
evolutionary  framework  seems  our  best  shot  at  making  social  and  biological  sciences 
commensurable, which is a worthy goal in itself. If I am right that existing non-evolutionary 
theories  of  religion  could  be  recast  as  constraining  selection  in  various  ways,  then  the 
evolutionary approach should be an obvious choice.
5.2: Can We Get Along?
This thesis has presented a number of controversies, from the adaptationist/spandrelist debates in 
biology and the science of religion, respectively, to levels of selection, and whether to adopt an 
evolutionary approach to studying religion. I think in fact that the differences are not as critical  
as  we  might  assume.  As  has  been  mentioned  earlier,  most  debates  in  evolutionary  biology 
1 In response to the Discovery Institute’s list of 700 scientists doubting evolution, the National Center for Science 
Education launched ‘Project Steve,’ a tongue-in-cheek list of supporters of evolution where only scientists named 
Steve were allowed to sign. That list is currently at well over 1100 scientists, which should indicate a support for 
evolution at well above 99% in the scientific community. See http://ncse.com/taking-action/project-steve
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concern quantitative differences—the degree to which particular mechanisms affect the outcome 
of evolution, rather than whether or not they exist at all. This of course means that they are not 
matters of us or them, from which a clear-cut winner will eventually emerge. As we have seen,  
both sides in the biological adaptationist/spandrelist debate to a large degree recognise the other
—clearly  constraints  exist,  and  clearly  adaptations  are  a  prominent,  even  perhaps  the  most 
prominent, mechanism of evolutionary change. It is almost—almost—so that we can say that the 
two sides are in perfect harmony, and scientists can more or less choose sides based on research 
interests,  rather  than  evaluating  who is  right.  Granted,  the  at  times  heated  debate  indicates 
otherwise,  but  to  a  large  extent,  they  are  two sides  of  the  same  coin,  rather  than  different 
denominations.
I think this point is all the more valid for the science of religion.  Perhaps most obviously, 
adaptationist accounts do not rule out the possibility that religiousness is based on traits that in 
the first place appeared as by-products, such as HADD and MCI. I hope furthermore I have been  
able to show convincingly that cultural evolution, most often assumed to arise as a by-product,2 is 
entirely compatible with adaptationist theories of religion.
This is the main reason I choose to argue for a family resemblance definition of religion—I do 
not think religion is a single thing at all. Adaptationists have produced many a convincing study 
of  cooperative  religious  societies,  but  how do they  account  for  the  utter  seclusion  of  some 
religious specialists, such as the forest monks of Sri Lanka (Carrithers 1983), or the ten years of 
self-mummification endured by the  Sokushinbutsu (Jeremiah 2010)? Extreme cases such as these 
might be rare, but a complete theory of religion will have to account for them nonetheless. Since, 
for individuals as these, however few, religious practice amounts to such extremely maladaptive 
behaviour, we have to allow at the very least that the spread of some religions is a by-product. On 
the other hand, in some communities, such as the Hutterites (Sosis 2003), religion seems to serve 
a strong adaptive purpose. Yet, while it makes no sense to ask whether or not all religiousness is  
an adaptation, or if all religion is adaptive, we could well ask what came first, or what is most  
common. I am not aware of any theories about how religion arose as an adaptation—rather, what 
adaptationists  of  religion are  concerned with,  is  how religion functions adaptively,  while  the 
2 Although culture could well be an adaptation in its own right, see Richerson and Boyd 2005, ch. 4
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question  of  origin  is  left  unanswered.  If  we  can  assume  for  the  time  being,  then,  that 
religiousness’  origin as a by-product is  not seriously challenged, then the interesting question 
becomes what the ratio of adaptive religions to non-adaptive religions is. This question unifies 
both adaptationist and by-product theories, and I think it is the question we should be asking. 
The scenario I am proposing, is this: Evolution has endowed us with adaptive mental modules 
such as HADD an a propensity to remember MCI concepts, which in turn, as a by-product, 
predispose us to religious beliefs. Some of these beliefs, quite by accident, are structured so that  
they foster cooperation through costly or hard-to-fake signalling. These beliefs will be cultural 
adaptations and are likely to be spread at greater rates, if not directly through proselytising, then 
indirectly through the fitness benefits they confer upon believers. Still,  non-adaptive religions 
may persist either because they are selectively insignificant, or because selection against them is  
constrained in some way. Thus, we end up with a host of entirely different,  not  necessarily  
related religions—some culturally transmitted, some adaptive, some pure by-products, but with 
no need anywhere for a biological adaptation for religiousness. Dennett explains how culture 
reduces the need for adaptive explanations of human behaviour, while at the same time showing 
that similar phenomena may well be unrelated:
The very considerations  that  in  other  parts  of  the  biosphere  count  for  an  explanation in  terms of  natural 
selection of an adaptation—manifest utility, obvious value, undeniable reasonableness of design—count against the 
need  for any such explanation in the case of human behavior. If a trick is that good, then it will be routinely  
rediscovered by every culture, without need of either genetic descent or cultural transmission of the particulars.  
(Dennett 1995, 487, italics in original)
There is no reason to assume that religion is any different. As long as we agree that humans have 
a  general  propensity  for  religiousness,  and  we  do,  and  that  religion-as-an-adaptation  can  be 
explained through cultural selection, and I think we should, then it follows that adaptive religions 
will appear at different places, unrelated to each other.  Incidentally,  remember that the main 
problem adaptive religion is supposed to solve, is non-kin cooperation (kin based cooperation is 
understood fairly easily, as seen in kin selection and exemplified by the eusociality of insects such 
as ants, termites and bees). Candace Alcorta (Alcorta 2009, 118) writes that
[w]hen there is no need for non-kin cooperation, or when other institutions more efficiently or effectively meet 
that need, then religion and adolescent rites of passage should be absent or greatly attenuated because the time 
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and  energy  costs  these  entail  are  not  offset  by  the  benefits  religion  confers.  Recent  declines  in  religious 
participation in modern European nation-states suggest such a trend.
In other words, even if religion is one of Dennett’s ‘good tricks,’ we should not be surprised to 
see nonadaptive forms of religion as well, perhaps particularly in modern societies. With all this 
in mind, does it make sense to speak of religion? Only, I think, insofar as we employ a family  
resemblance definition. Some religions may be by-products, and others adaptive, and the adaptive 
ones will likely solve the problem of cooperation in different ways. There is no essence to speak 
of here, and we needn’t look for one. What we need is a theory to account for religion, and I 
think if we work together, then we have that. And I think that gives the evolutionary science of 
religion a solid application for acceptance among more traditional scholars of religion.
5.3: Conclusion
With this  thesis,  I  hope to have shown that adaptation has  been treated in the evolutionary 
science of religion somewhat more simplistic than the subject deserves, and that a closer look at  
how it is studied in biology can shed light on issues pertaining to religion. I conclude that the 
prevailing dichotomy between religion as an adaptation and religion as a by-product is somewhat 
misleading, and that religion is best understood as a mix between the two, preferably with the 
spread  of  particular  religions  studied  as  cultural  evolution.  At  the  same  time,  neither 
adaptationist  or by-product  theories  of  religion fully explain the phenomenon. Adaptationist  
theories explain how religion can evolve as a system of hard-to-fake signals of commitment, but 
they do not explain how an ability to fake such signals has not evolved in response. By-product 
theories, on the other hand, do not explain how selection has been constrained from removing 
such by-products. These theories seem to demand such explanations, respectively.
To paraphrase Dennett (1995, 270), good evolutionary reasoning makes use of adaptations and 
constraints both. For a phenomenon as complex and multifaceted as religion, I find it hard to see 
how an explanation can be produced without both these being integral to it. Furthermore, I hope 
I have shown how different religions can both have common elements and still be either distantly 
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related or not related at all, through a combination of cultural evolution and selection producing 
similar adaptations under similar conditions.
Perceiving religion in this way as a mix between two, or even multiple, partly related, but  
distinct phenomena, opens up for a family resemblance definition of our subject. I think this 
thought can be taken further still—if religion is not taken as something sui generis, then perhaps 
we should do well to blur the distinction between religion and culture in general, in the hopes  
that it will smooth interdisciplinary work, and emphasise the importance of cultural evolution. 
Scientists of religion will still know what their main interests are, but I think it will be helpful to  
pay more attention to the fact that religion is just one part of our magnificent cultural tapestry.  
Then perhaps  we would  not  need to  bother  about  questions  such  as  are  rock  concerts  and 
football matches modern day religions—who cares if they are, but we’ve got the tools to study 
them as if they were. Consilience works both ways; not only should scientists of religion reach 
out to biology, we should blur the distinction with other social sciences as well. In the end what 
counts is the scientific tools we apply, not what we apply them to.
GLOSSARY
adaptation. A trait, whether biological or cultural, produced by natural selection.
adaptive. A trait x is said to be adaptive in environment y if it confers a fitness benefit in 
that environment. That trait may, but need not, be an adaptation.
allele. One of two or more variants of a gene.
altruism. The tendency of one organism to promote the welfare of another, to its own 
detriment. Opposite of selfishness.
by-product. A trait, or aspect of a trait, that is not itself an adaptation, but a consequence 
of one.
consilience. Compatibility between different scientific disciplines.
constraint. A mechanism or effect which limits the ability to evolve an  adaptation in a 
certain context.
eusociality. A form of organisation found particularly in the social insects and naked mole 
rats. Characterised by sterile workers assisting the reproduction of the queen.  Enables 
cooperation through intricate kinships.
evolutionarily  stable  strategy  (ESS). A  strategy  that,  once  common in  a  population, 
cannot be invaded by a competing strategy. A mix of two or more stable strategies is also 
possible in some cases. Compare with an evolutionarily stable state, a state to which a 
population will return to after a disturbance.
frequency-dependent selection. Selection where the fitness of a phenotype is determined 
by how common it is. Can be negative or positive: In the former, rare traits are selected  
for, while in the latter, being common is beneficial.
gene. The biological unit of heredity and selection. 
genetic drift. Chance variations from one generation to the next in gene frequencies.
genotype. An organism’s genetic constitution. Compare with phenotype. 
hard-to-fake. A signal about an organism’s internal state or intentions considered reliable 
to the extent that producing a false signal of the same kind would be difficult or very 
costly.
heterozygous. A  trait  that  is  produced  by  different  alleles  at  a  particular  locus  in  a  
chromosomal pair, as when different alleles are inherited from each parent. Opposite of  
homozygous.
homozygous. A  trait  that  is  produced  by  similar  alleles  at  a  particular  locus  in  a 
chromosomal pair, as when the same allele is inherited from each parent. 
hyperactive agency detection device (HADD). A theoretical mental module evolved to 
detect  agents  in  the  environment,  to  avoid  ambushes  and  the  like.  Hypothesised  to 
produce belief in superhuman agents as a by-product when triggered erroneously. 
locus. A  particular  spot  on  a  chromosome.  Can  be  inhabited  by  only  one  gene  per 
individual—competitors for the same locus are said to be alleles of each other.
meiosis. The  process  by which  new sex  cells  are  produced.  A cell  division  where  the 
chromosomal pairs  are  reshuffled.  Two new cells  are  produced,  each with only one 
chromosome per original pair, the new chromosomes being blends of the original pairs.
meme. A hypothesised cultural unit of heredity and selection. Compare to gene.
minimally counter-intuitive concepts (MCI). A concept that includes just enough of a 
breach of  expectation to be maximally memorable.  Hypothesised to account for the 
prevalence of religious ideas.
mutation. A change in genetic code, typically occurring during meiosis. The source of new 
alleles and new genes.
optimality. The theoretical point of maximum adaptation for a trait or individual. May not 
be reachable, either because of constraints or competing selection pressures.
phenotype. The observable characteristics of an organism, produced by genes interacting 
with the environment.
pleiotropy. The  property  of  a  gene  to  have  multiple  phenotypic  effects.  Can  be  a 
constraint  on  optimality  in  that  an  adaptive  trait  is  coupled  genetically  with  a  less  
favourable one, possibly outweighing the benefit.
replicator. A generalised unit of heredity and selection. Replicators have (1) fecundity, (2) 
fidelity,  and (3) longevity, that is:  ability to (1) reproduce frequently with a (2) high 
degree of precision and (3) last for long enough to be selectively significant.  Genes are 
said to embody these traits, memes are controversial in this regard, particularly in regard 
to fidelity. 
runaway selection. A selective process in which traits are exaggerated over time. Often the 
result  of  sexual  selection  where  (typically  female)  preference  for  high  values  of  a 
quantitative trait is coupled with traits of such values (typically in males), resulting in a  
feedback dynamic where both are amplified.
spandrel. A  by-product of  an  adaptation that takes a necessary shape or form due to 
developmental constraints. May serve a secondary adaptive function, but is not selected 
for this purpose.
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